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The mobile workforce, which consists of employees that do not have one fixed
place of work and are linked to a corporate base using a mobile computing device,
is expected to grow to 75% of the total United States workforce, or approximately
212.1 million people, by 2015 [28]. Advances in technology, such as the increasing
abundance of portable computing devices and the prevalence of wireless broadband,
combined with the fact that more companies are allowing employees to use their
own devices to access the enterprise, create an environment in which these workers
can access corporate resources anytime, anywhere, with a myriad of devices having
varying configurations. Having ubiquitous access to resources has its benefits, like
increased productivity, but also creates unique challenges to ensuring appropriate
security. Traditional approaches to security are not suitable for this emerging com-
puting environment, because they are based on assumptions that no longer hold,
such as well-defined situations, consistent configurations, and static contexts. For
this reason, these approaches typically base security decisions on statically assigned
attributes like identity or role. In the highly dynamic computing environment of
mobile workers, context-aware security, in which context is utilized to allow security
to adapt to the current situation, is essential. This dissertation presents our efforts
to address the mismatch between traditional, context-insensitive security and this
emerging dynamic computing environment with a novel security paradigm, shrink-
wrapped security, in which a tight coupling is provided between a user’s current
situation and security. It features the following:
• A novel security paradigm, shrink-wrapped security, which involves utilizing
context to tightly fuse a user’s situation and security.
• A usable definition of security-relevant context, along with goal-oriented guide-
lines and a corresponding taxonomy to facilitate the systematic identification
of contextual attributes that are most pertinent to a security service.
• A context acquisition and management framework to facilitate the develop-
ment and use of shrink-wrapped security services for the mobile workforce.
The layered architecture of this framework supports secure context acquisi-
tion, utilization, and monitoring by security services and was designed with
the resource constraints of mobile devices in mind.
• An approach based on logic programming to practically incorporate the use
of security-relevant context into the security policies that govern security ser-
vices. This technique is aligned with the shrink-wrapped security concept of
utilizing a comprehensive set of relevant context, while remaining practical
and manageable by abstracting relevant contextual attributes to a security
level associated with the objectives of a security service.
• The implementation and evaluation of shrink-wrapped access control, which
serves as a practical demonstration of the feasibility of shrink-wrapped secu-
rity.
Shrink-Wrapped Security: Tightly Coupling Situation and Security
by
Gleneesha Myra Johnson Williams
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfilment




Professor Ashok Agrawala, Chair/Advisor





Gleneesha Myra Johnson Williams
2014
Dedication
To God; my husband and best friend, Alvester Williams III; my parents,
Margie and Ronald Robertson, and Glenn Johnson; and all of my family and friends.
Words cannot express my gratitude for your love, support, encouragement.
ii
Acknowledgements
First, and foremost, I would like to thank God for His many blessings during
my academic journey.
I am incredibly thankful for my husband and my parents. Their faith in me
provided the encouragement to persevere though the challenging process of obtaining
a Ph.D. I would also like to thank my in-laws, Carol Williams and Alvester Williams
II for your reassurance and prayers. This journey would not have been possible
without the support of my family and friends, and I am appreciative for all of them.
I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Ashok Agrawala, for encouraging and
believing in me and my research. I would like to thank my committee members,
Dr. Atif Memon, Dr. Adam Porter, Dr. Don Perlis, and Dr. Carol Espy-Wilson for
their insightful comments and feedback.
I am grateful to my PROMISE family for being a wonderful support system,
including, but not limited to: Dr. Johnetta Davis, Dr. Renetta Tull, Dr. Carol
Parham, Dr. Wendy Carter, Gloria Anglon, Dr. Asha-Lateef Williams, Angel
Miles, Dr. Charles Glover, Dr. Patrice Gregory, Dr. Sophoria Westmoreland, Dr.
Sean Barnes, Erika Thompson, Wynsome Bryan, Dr. Geriel Ettienne-Modeste , Dr.
Heather Holden, and Dean Christopher Jones.
I appreciate the Faculty, Staff, fellow graduate students, and friends that I
worked with, in one way or another, while attending the University of Maryland, in-
cluding, but not limited to: Dr. Christian Almazan, Dr. Neha Gupta, Dr. Matthew
Mah, Preeti Bhargava, Morgan Kleene, Praveen Vaddadi, James Lampton, Tomas
iii
Lampo, Dr. David Thaw, Dr. Shivsubramani Krishnamoorthy, Dr. Yi-Jung Lo,
Dr. Paulo Shakarian, Dr. Alexandros Tzannes, Dr. Ben Shneiderman, Dr. Sandro
Fouche, Leslie Milton, Adelaide Findlay, Fatima Bangura, Jennifer Story, Brenda
Chick, Gwen Kaye, Dr. Eric Ditrich, Emely Martinez, Dr. Mugizi Rwebangira, Dr.
Joel Branch, and Dr. Elodie Billionniere.
I am thankful for the guidance provided by my wonderful mentors, including,
but not limited to: Dr. Yul Williams, Dr. Dwayne Rosenburgh, Dr. Brian Cohen,
Dr. Cyntrica Eaton, Dr. Shaun Gittens, Dr. Juan Gilbert, Julina Edwards, and
Dr. Legand Burge.
Finally, to all whose names I did not mention, charge it to my head and not




List of Figures vii
1 Introduction 1
2 Background 9
2.1 Traditional Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Context-aware Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Context-aware Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Shrink-Wrapped Security 14
3.1 Defining Security-Relevant Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.1 Definition Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2 Identifying Relevant Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.1 Taxonomy of Security-Relevant Context . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2.1.1 Relevant Entity Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2.1.2 Affected Security Objective Dimension . . . . . . . . 18
3.2.1.3 Some Guidelines for Classifying Context by the Af-
fected Security Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.1.4 Taxonomy Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.2 Some Guidelines to Facilitate the Identification of Relevant
Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.2.1 Using the Guidelines to Evaluate Current Systems . 27
3.2.3 Repository of Security-Relevant Context . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 Incorporating Context into a Security Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.0.1 Likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.1 Using Generalized Annotated Programs for Shrink-Wrapped
Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3.1.1 GAPs Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 A Framework for Context Acquisition and Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4.1 Framework Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4 The Implementation and Use of Shrink-Wrapped Access Control 45
4.1 Shrink-Wrapped Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2 Baseline System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3 Updated System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.4 Implementation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4.1 Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4.2 Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.5 Usage Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.5.1 Bring Your Own Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
v
4.5.2 Targeted Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5 The Evaluation of Shrink-Wrapped Access Control 67
5.1 Performance Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.1.1 Experiment Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.1.2 Experiment Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.1.3 Analysis of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.2 Security Enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6 Related Work 79
6.1 More Comprehensive Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.2 Security-relevant Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.3 Context-Aware Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.4 Logic Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7 Conclusions and Future Work 85
7.1 Research Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
A Repository of Security-Relevant Context 90
B Definition of Terms 100




1.1 Mobile worker requesting access to remote resource . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Basic access control model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 Flow chart for identifying relevant context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Example likelihood question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Example GAP (Π) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.4 GUI for our GAP editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5 Policy builder GUI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.6 Shrink-wrapped Security Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1 Shrink-wrapped Access Control Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2 Baseline Rover System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3 Updated Rover System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4 Rover client user resource request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.5 Administrator’s Interface - defining access control rules . . . . . . . . 57
4.6 Requesting access to a resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.7 Interpretations produced by multiple applications of TΠ . . . . . . . 60
4.8 Resource displayed in the Resource Container . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.9 Disabling on-access scanning capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.10 Interpretations produced by multiple applications of TΠ . . . . . . . 63
4.11 Access Revoked after rule no longer satisfied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.12 Updating Operating Condition to ’High Alert’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.1 Average response time in milliseconds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.2 System load of devices during experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3 Response times with Rover Client Agent caching . . . . . . . . . . . . 74




The mobile workforce, which consists of employees that do not have one fixed
place of work, and are linked to a corporate base using a mobile computing device, is
rapidly increasing. According to the International Data Corporation (IDC), the mo-
bile workforce is expected to grow to 75% of the total United States (US) workforce,
or approximately 212.1 million people, by 2015 [28]. The increasing abundance
and convenience of powerful and portable computing devices, combined with the
prevalence of wireless broadband availability, creates an environment in which these
workers can access an array of corporate data and resources anytime and anywhere.
The fact that more information technology (IT) departments are exploring allowing
employees to use their own devices to access the enterprise (bring your own device
or BYOD)means that they can also access these resources with a myriad of devices
with varying configurations. Although advances in technology have enhanced the
practicality of ubiquitous access to resources, which has its benefits like increased
productivity, they also create unique challenges to ensuring appropriate security.
Traditional approaches to security are not appropriate for the emerging, dy-
namic computing environment of mobile users because they are based on assump-
tions that no longer hold. Traditional computer security mechanisms were developed
when computing was typically in a static, stationary environment and are based
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on assumptions of relatively stable and well-defined situations, consistent config-
urations, and static contexts [27]. Accordingly, these mechanisms typically base
security decisions on statically assigned attributes like identity or role. In the dy-
namic computing environment of mobile workers, users may: 1) use a variety of
mobile computing devices with varying configurations; 2) connect over various net-
works; and 3) be in varying physical settings when requesting access to resources.
In this computing paradigm, security should be based not only on the identity of
the user, but also the user’s context(e.g., co-location, network characteristics, and
device characteristics), which can change frequently and rapidly.
In order to address the security challenges of such mobile access, context-aware
security, in which context is utilized to allow security to adapt to the current situa-
tion, is essential. Context is commonly defined as “any information that can be used
to characterize the situation of an entity. An entity is a person, place, or object that
is considered relevant to the interaction between a user and an application, including
the user and application themselves” [22]. Consider the following scenario: Alice,
a mobile worker who has a Secret security clearance, should be allowed to access
documents classified at Secret or below via her mobile device in any room of one
of her employer’s buildings, as long as there are no individuals in the room without
the appropriate clearance. Such situation-specific restrictions are not supported in
traditional access control, so a security administrator would likely statically grant
Alice access to these documents to avoid hindering her from performing her duties.
It would be left up to Alice to ensure that she does not access classified documents
outside of her employer’s building or in the company of unauthorized individuals.
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Allowing a user to have more privileges than necessary or appropriate for the current
situation creates the potential for accidental and intentional abuse. For example,
Alice may not know that her coworker, Bob, had his clearance revoked and that she
should close classified documents when he enters the room. Likewise, Alice may be
a disgruntled employee who intentionally lets unauthorized individuals view Secret
information on her mobile device. By using context-aware security, the security
administrator would be able to express the appropriate restriction in the security
policy. In addition, a context-aware security mechanism would have the ability to
enforce the policy by detecting when an unauthorized party has come into close
proximity to Alice and temporarily revoke her access to Secret documents until the
threat of unauthorized access is removed.
Several researchers have realized the importance of utilizing context in security,
but there are still issues that need to be investigated. Although existing approaches
consider context, we contend that they are still relatively static, based on factors
such as limited context use, which has negative security implications, and infrequent
context consideration, which limits the dynamicity of an approach [16, 11]. Many
systems are vague about what context they consider (e.g., [61, 37, 59, 38]), but
systems that are explicit about what context they utilize, primarily consider the
traditional aspects, such as user location (e.g., [10, 27]). While this common form
of context is certainly important to characterize the situation of a mobile user, it
is often inadequate. The context utilized by a system, forms that system’s model
of a situation. Therefore, merely considering the most commonly used elements
of context abstracts away important aspects of a situation that could be useful in
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decision-making, leading to a deficient view of a situation. Basing security-related
decisions on such a view could be just as damaging as having no context at all,
because it can lead to poor decisions based on an incomplete picture.
Consider the situation illustrated in Figure 1.1(a). Alice is at one of her
company’s satellite locations and requests access to a Secret corporate file. Her
employer has started using context-aware access control, but currently only utilizes
limited context, the location of the user. Since Alice is at an acceptable location,
one of her employer’s satellite locations, access to the resource is granted. If a more
comprehensive set of context is used, then a more informed and appropriate decision
could be made. For example, utilizing context of the user’s computing device, access
mechanism and surrounding environment can reveal that Alice has a virus on her
device; that she is connecting over an insecure network; and that she is co-located
with unknown people (see figure 1.1(b)). With all of this additional information, a
more informed and appropriate decision of denying access while the user is in this
insecure state can be made. Given the dynamic nature of mobile users’ situations,
even if Alice had been in an approved state at the time access was requested, and
was accordingly granted access, it would have been critical to monitor her state
and maintain control of the resource in case a change in her context warranted a
revocation of access.
In order to meet the needs of the dynamic computing environment of the
mobile workforce, our perspectives on security have to change, requiring the devel-
opment of new approaches. We propose the notion of shrink-wrapped security, a
security paradigm in which a tight coupling is provided between a user’s current
4
(a) Limited context used
(b) Additional context used
Figure 1.1: Mobile worker requesting access to remote resource
situation and security. This is not possible when only limited context is utilized.
In order to support shrink-wrapped security, a more comprehensive notion of con-
text than what is currently used by context-aware security systems is necessary.
In addition, it requires a highly dynamic approach. As such, with shrink-wrapped
security, as the situation changes, the security changes also, and is therefore highly
dynamic and constantly reflects the needs dictated by the situation. We use the
term “shrink-wrapped” to convey the tight fit of security to what is appropriate,
based on the current situation.
Various security services (e.g., cryptography, authentication, and access con-
trol) can be shrink-wrapped, but this research focused on shrink-wrapped access
control. With shrink-wrapped access control, context is utilized to to dynamically
adjust a user’s permissions so that at any given time she only has permissions that
are appropriate based on her current situation.
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The purpose of this research was to explore and gain a greater understanding
of our proposed paradigm, shrink-wrapped security, and to assess its feasibility
through implementation. In order to study shrink-wrapped security, we first had to
develop a solution that made it possible. This required addressing the need for a
more comprehensive notion of security-relevant context, which entailed first defining
exactly what constitutes such context. We used our definition to develop a taxonomy
of security-relevant context and corresponding guidelines to facilitate the systematic
identification of relevant context. We developed a framework to facilitate the secure
acquisition of such context, and a technique to practically incorporate the use of
such context in a security service. Finally, we used these tools and techniques to
develop a prototype shrink-wrapped access control service. This prototype allowed
us to more concretely explore our ideas.
Contributions of this dissertation include the following:
• A novel security paradigm, shrink-wrapped security, which involves utilizing
context to tightly fuse a user’s situation and security, to address the security
challenges associated with the highly dynamic computing environment of the
emergent mobile workforce.
• A usable definition of security-relevant context, along with goal oriented guide-
lines and a corresponding taxonomy to facilitate the systematic identification
of contextual attributes that are most pertinent to a security service. These
contributions deal with a key challenge of context-aware system development
- identifying relevant context.
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• A context acquisition and management framework to facilitate the develop-
ment and use of shrink-wrapped security services for the mobile workforce.
The layered architecture of this framework supports secure context acquisi-
tion, utilization, and monitoring by security services and was designed with
the resource constraints of mobile devices in mind.
• An approach based on logic programming to practically incorporate the use
of security-relevant context into the security policies that govern security ser-
vices. This technique is aligned with the shrink-wrapped security concept of
utilizing a comprehensive set of relevant context, while remaining practical
and manageable by abstracting relevant contextual attributes to a security
level associated with the objectives of a security service.
• The implementation and evaluation of shrink-wrapped access control, which
serves as a practical demonstration of the feasibility of shrink-wrapped secu-
rity.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2 we
present an overview of the concepts that are fundamental to our work, including: tra-
ditional access control, context, general context-aware systems, and context-aware
security. Chapter 3 highlights the various components necessary to realize shrink-
wrapped security. We introduce our definition and corresponding guidelines to fa-
cilitate the systematic identification of security-relevant context. We also present
an approach to practically and easily incorporate the use of such context into se-
curity services. Finally, we present a framework to facilitate the secure acquisition,
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monitoring and use of relevant context. Details about the implementation of our
logical framework, and shrink-wrapped access control are contained in chapter 4,
along with usage cases that describe real-world examples of how users interact with
the system. In chapter 5 we present an evaluation of shrink-wrapped access control,
and chapter 6 reviews related work. We conclude with chapter 7, which contains an




In this chapter we present an overview of the concepts that are fundamental
to our work, including: traditional access control, context, general context-aware
systems, and context-aware security.
2.1 Traditional Access Control
Access control is an essential aspect of security as it aims to prevent unautho-
rized access to protected resources. It involves controlling access to resources after
a user has been authenticated and granted access to a system. Access to various
resources, such as files, sensitive business data, and business applications, can be
managed. This is accomplished by controlling what subjects (such as users and pro-
cesses) can access what resources, and what operations they can perform on these
resources (e.g. read, write, execute).
There are various types of access control, including discretionary, mandatory
and role-based. With discretionary access control, the owner of a resource deter-
mines what subjects should be able to access the resource and the range of operations
they should be allowed to perform on the resource. With mandatory access con-
trol, access decisions are based on classifications that are beyond the control of the
owner of a resource. Users are assigned a classification, which typically denotes their
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verified trustworthiness, and resources are assigned a classification, which typically
denotes the level of damage that could result from unauthorized access. With role-
based access control, users are assigned to roles based on various properties, typically
functional responsibility within an enterprise, and permissions are associated with
roles instead of individual users.
Figure 2.1 shows a basic access control model. A subject requests access to a
resource. This request will identify the particular resource and an access operation
appropriate for that type of resource. All access requests are mediated by an access
control mechanism, which decides if the subject should be granted access or not
based on an access control policy. The session with the access control mechanism
ends after the access decision has been made.
Figure 2.1: Basic access control model
An access control policy contains a set of rules which specify when access
should be allowed or denied. Resource access has traditionally been based on stat-
ically assigned attributes such as identity, role, or classification. For example, a
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traditional rule for controlling access to a particular resource might be “If subject
role = Administrator, then grant access”. In this case, if the subject requesting ac-
cess has an active role of Administrator, she will be granted access to the resource.
Otherwise, she will not. When computing was confined to a static environment,
this was acceptable, because there were not many other factors to take into con-
sideration. However, much has changed, and users are increasingly computing in a
dynamic environment with changing context. This context needs to be considered
when making security-related decisions.
2.2 Context
Context has been defined in many ways by different researchers. We have
adopted the common and well accepted definition from Dey et al. [22].
Context is any information that can be used to characterize the situation of
an entity. An entity is a person, place, or object that is considered relevant to the
interaction between a user and an application, including the user and application
themselves.
A contextual attribute is a measurable context primitive (e.g., a user’s loca-
tion), and context is the full set of contextual attributes that comprise the situation
of an entity [18].
Two important words from Dey’s definition of context are “characterize” and
“relevant.” Characterization of a situation requires an examination of everything
related to the situation, not just common elements such as user location and time. A
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very large amount of information may have to be used to characterize the situation
of an entity, but only certain characteristics are relevant for a particular application.
2.3 Context-aware Systems
Context-aware systems can discover and utilize context to adapt their behavior
based on the current situation [48]. Context may be supplied from a variety of
sources, including: sensors embedded in a computing device, external sensors in the
environment, a context providing service, and system state.
Mark Weiser’s seminal paper, “The Computer for the 21st Century”, has
greatly influenced the field of context-aware computing. This paper explains his vi-
sion of Ubiquitous Computing, in which many computers are seamlessly integrated
into the physical environment [57]. The objective was to support and enhance a
user’s experience by making life and tasks easier. A significant body of research ex-
plores ways in which that goal can be accomplished. For example, there is research
on virtual tour guide applications that use location, one of the most commonly used
forms of context, to display information about places or objects in the user’s vicinity
[17]. There is research on applications geared towards an office environment that
use location to route a user’s incoming calls to the phone closest to the user, or to
present information on the closest display [55]. Less research effort has focused on
how context-awareness can be used to enhance security.
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2.4 Context-aware Security
Context-aware security involves security mechanisms dynamically adapting to
the user’s situation based on context. Context has been incorporated into different
security services in various ways and at different levels. For example it has been
used to supplement user attributes that are traditionally used in authentication and
access control, such as username and password [20]. It has also been used in a more
primary way and replaced common user attributes, resulting in security decisions
based solely on context [27]. This is useful when the identities or roles of users
are not known in advance. A majority of the research on context-aware security
focuses on access control. Integrating context into access control allows permission
assignments to be based on more than just the identity or role of the user, but also
on the current situation of the user.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented an overview of the concepts that are fundamental
to our research. We described different types of access control, access control polices,
and presented a basic access control model. We presented the definition of context
we utilize, described general context-aware systems, and context-aware systems that
focus on security. In the next chapter we present our notions of context-aware




In this chapter we present the various components necessary to realize shrink-
wrapped security. Recall that shrink-wrapped security is a security paradigm that
involves providing a tight coupling between a user’s current situation and security,
and this requires a more comprehensive notion of context than what is currently
used by context-aware security systems. Accordingly, we present a definition and
corresponding guidelines to facilitate the systematic identification of relevant con-
text. We also present an approach to practically and easily incorporate the use of
such context into security services. Shrink-wrapped security is highly dynamic and
context must be monitored to assure that as a mobile user’s context changes, the
security changes accordingly. Thus we also present a framework to facilitate the
secure acquisition, monitoring and use of relevant context.
3.1 Defining Security-Relevant Context
Before any efforts to provide a comprehensive notion of security-relevant con-
text can be successful, the term needs a specific definition. Providing a specific
definition is essential because it will prevent ambiguity and confusion about what
actually constitutes such context.
“Context” and “security” are terms that are already overloaded with many
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definitions. We aim to provide a definition of security-relevant context that can
be agreed upon within the community. Therefore, instead of adding yet another
definition to each term, we derived our definition of security-relevant context from
a widely accepted and agreed upon definition of context [22], and an authoritative
definition of information security [5]. The following is our definition of security-
relevant context:
Security-relevant context consists of the set of contextual attributes that can be
used to characterize the situation of an entity, whose value affects the choice of the
most appropriate controls or the configuration of those controls to protect informa-
tion and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability.
Confidentiality refers to preserving authorized restrictions on access to, and dis-
closure of, information. Integrity refers to guarding against improper information
modification or destruction. Availability refers to guarding against the unauthorized
disruption of access to information, ensuring the timely and reliable access to and
use of information [5].
The key insight we provide to the definition of security-relevant context lies
in the phrase “whose value affects the choice of the most appropriate controls or
the configuration of those controls.” The values of security-relevant contextual at-
tributes affect the choice of the most appropriate controls, because they impact the
likelihood of certain threats to confidentiality, integrity, and availability being re-
alized. Therefore, based on their values, the most appropriate controls to mitigate
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those threats can be employed. For example, the value of the contextual attribute,
connection security, impacts what controls should be used to ensure confidentiality.
The value of that attribute can determine the most appropriate encryption algo-
rithm (control) to use for application level encryption (for example, DES or AES)
and the configuration of the selected control (for example, key length).
3.1.1 Definition Discussion
There may be context that will not be considered security-relevant accord-
ing to our definition that designers of context-aware security systems deem useful.
Consider the example of a context-aware access control system. Temporal context,
such as the time of day or day of the week, does not directly or inherently affect a
system’s attempt to protect resources from unauthorized access. However, tempo-
ral context is frequently used in context-aware access control systems. We believe
that such context is usually utilized to specify and enforce corporate policy com-
pliance, not because of its innate effect on security. We do not deny the utility of
such context, but it is our objective to facilitate the identification of context that is
most pertinent to a security system, i.e., context that impacts a system’s attempt
to achieve its security objectives.
3.2 Identifying Relevant Context
Identifying relevant context is one of the key challenges of context-aware sys-
tem development [49, 39]. This difficulty has been attributed to the fact that there
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are no elicitation methods for context [50]. Without an elicitation method, develop-
ers must use ad-hoc approaches to identify context. We have developed a taxonomy
to be used in conjunction with guidelines, which will enable designers of context-
aware security services to use a systematic approach to identify relevant context
[31]. These tools can be utilized in the design of context-aware security systems to
help prevent forms of security-relevant context from being overlooked. In addition
they can be used in the evaluation of existing systems to determine if additional
context needs to be considered, or if existing context may not be pertinent for that
system.
3.2.1 Taxonomy of Security-Relevant Context
There are various features of security-relevant context that can be used as a
basis for classification, including: context origin, the potentially affected security
objective, and the entity the context is inherently related to. Determining which
features are most appropriate to use depends on the purpose of the taxonomy. The
purpose of our taxonomy, which is specific to our focus domain of access control
for the mobile workforce, is to facilitate a comprehensive notion of security-relevant
context. Accordingly, our taxonomy classifies context along the two dimensions
[34] we feel best accomplish that goal: the relevant entity and the affected security
objective.
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3.2.1.1 Relevant Entity Dimension
The relevant entity dimension stems from Dey’s definition of context. The
categories of this dimension consist of the entities that are relevant to the interaction
between a mobile user and a context-aware security service, including: the user, the
user’s computing device, the communication mechanism between the user and the
security service, and the surrounding environment. Context should be classified
by the entity to which it is inherently related and which it characterizes. This
is intuitive for the user, user’s computing device, and communication mechanism.
Context that characterizes the situation surrounding the user, but not the user
herself, including the physical environment, falls into the surrounding environment
category.
Table 3.1 shows relevant entities and examples of corresponding context.
3.2.1.2 Affected Security Objective Dimension
The purpose of our taxonomy is not to facilitate a comprehensive notion of
context in general, but of security-relevant context. Accordingly, classifying context
by an additional dimension, the affected security objective, will ensure that context
is indeed relevant. The categories for this dimension consist of the fundamental
security objectives: confidentiality, integrity and availability. Context should be
classified by the security objective(s) it affects.
To prevent categorization of security-relevant context at too high of a level,
we identified sub-categories. This was done by considering domain-specific threats
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Table 3.1: Relevant entities and example context
Entity Example Context
The user User location, authentication mechanism
used, etc.
The user’s computing device Orientation of device, antivirus software sta-
tus, etc.
The communication mechanism Connection security, networks traversed, net-
work topology, etc.
The surrounding environment Co-location of people, co-location of devices,
lighting, noise level, temperature, etc.
to the security objectives.
Threat Model
Resources may be accessed by an unauthorized entity, resulting in a
breach of confidentiality. The following lists some of the ways in which this may
happen:
• An unauthorized entity may impersonate an authorized entity and obtain ac-
cess to a resource
• An unauthorized entity may obtain physical or remote access to an authorized
user’s computing device
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• An unauthorized entity may “sniff” a resource while in transit to an authorized
user’s computing device
• An unauthorized entity may gain indirect access to a resource through prox-
imity
Resources may be modified by an unauthorized entity, resulting in a
breach of integrity. The following lists some of the ways in which this may
happen:
• An unauthorized entity may impersonate an authorized entity and make unau-
thorized alterations
• An unauthorized entity may alter a resource while in transit to an authorized
entity
• An unauthorized entity may alter a resource once it arrives at an authorized
user’s computing device
An unauthorized entity may intentionally deny resource access to autho-
rized entities, resulting in a breach of availability 1. The following lists
some of the ways in which this may happen:
• An unauthorized entity may forge or alter the context of an authorized entity
to deny them access to a resource
1We do not attempt to address denial-of-service attacks that result from a malicious entity
jamming the communication mechanism so that resources can’t be delivered, or context can’t be
sent to the shrink-wrapped security service.
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3.2.1.3 Some Guidelines for Classifying Context by the Affected Se-
curity Objective
Confidentiality Category
Contextual attributes whose value affects the likelihood of threats of unauthorized
access to a resource being realized should be classified in this category. This category
is divided into four subcategories:
• access by entity impersonating an authorized entity
• access via unauthorized access to an authorized users computing device
• unauthorized access via resource sniffing while in transit
• indirect, unauthorized access through proximity to an authorized user
An example of context related to the user’s surrounding environment that should
be classified in the subcategory indirect access through proximity is the co-location
of people. If the user is co-located with people lacking the proper authorization to
access a resource, then it is possible for those people to obtain unauthorized access.
For example a co-located person can look at the screen of the requesting user’s
computing device. This would result in a breach of confidentiality.
Integrity Category
Contextual attributes whose value affects the likelihood of threats of unauthorized
modification to a resource being realized should be classified in this category. This
category is divided into three subcategories:
• modification by an unauthorized entity impersonating an authorized entity
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• unauthorized resource modification while in transit
• modification via unauthorized access to an authorized users computing device
An example of context related to the communication mechanism that could be
classified in the subcategory resource altered while in transit is the security of the
connection. If the connection is not secured, then it is easier for a malicious party
to alter a resource on the path to the user, resulting in a breach of integrity.
Availability Category
Contextual attributes whose value affects the likelihood of threats of intentional
denial of access to a resource being realized should be classified in this category.
This category has one subcategory:
• An unauthorized entity may forge or alter the context of an authorized entity
to deny them access to a resource
An example of context related to the user’s computing device that could be classified
in this category is the status of the antivirus software. If the antivirus software is
missing or severely outdated, then it is probable that the device is infected with
some type of malicious software. This malicious software could cause a number of
problems, including forging and altering context to prevent resource access.
3.2.1.4 Taxonomy Discussion
Taxonomy Completeness
The categories that were identified for the relevant entity and affected security ob-
jective dimensions do not cover all possibilities. Our goal here is not to deliniate
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an exhaustive list of possibilities, but to create an extensible framework. Our tax-
onomy is extensible, and additional categories can be added to both dimensions, if
necessary. For example, although confidentiality, integrity, and availability are the
fundamental goals of security, an additional objective such as non-repudiation may
be necessary, depending on the particular context-aware system.
Affected Security Objective Dimension
Some security-relevant contextual attributes may be classified in multiple categories
in the Affected Security Objective dimension. This is acceptable because the primary
dimension, Relevant Entity, is mutually exclusive, and the main objective of this
dimension is to ensure relevance.
3.2.2 Some Guidelines to Facilitate the Identification of Relevant
Context
The following guidelines have been prepared to be used in conjunction with our
taxonomy to facilitate the systematic identification of security-relevant context. The
application of the guidelines is illustrated by using them to identify context for the
development of a shrink-wrapped access control service. Figure 3.1 illustrates our
guidelines, which use a goal-oriented approach to identify relevant context. Such an
approach is similar to goal-oriented requirements engineering in which goals are used
to elicit system requirements [54]. A goal-oriented approach helps avoid irrelevant
context as goals provide a precise criterion for context pertinence [60].
• Step 1. Identify the security objective(s) of the target security ser-
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Figure 3.1: Flow chart for identifying relevant context
vice.
Identify the security objectives of the target security service. Recall that a
security service is a capability that supports one, or more, security require-
ments, such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Examples of security
services are encryption, access control, and authentication. The security ob-
jective of a security service can be identified by considering the high-level
goals of the security service and deciding which security objectives from the
affected security objective dimension align with those goals. For example, the
goal of access control is to ensure that subjects are only allowed to access
the resources for which they have authorization and access those resources in
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authorized ways. Therefore, the security objectives with which access control
aligns are confidentiality and integrity.
• Step 2. Identify the relevant entities for the target security service.
An entity is a person, place, or object. An entity is relevant if its state affects
the achievement of the security objectives identified in step 1 of the guidelines.
The entities that are directly a part of the interaction between a user and a
security service are a good place to start identifying relevant entities. How-
ever, entities that are not directly part of the interaction may also be relevant.
For example, the entity, surrounding environment, is not directly part of the
interaction between a user and an access control service, but as illustrated in
section 3.2.1.3, its state does impact one of the identified security objectives
(confidentiality). The entities relevant to the interaction between a user and
an access control service include all of the categories of the relevant entity
dimension: the user, the user’s computing device, the communication mecha-
nism, and the surrounding environment. However, this may not be the case
for every security service.
• Step 3. Identify context that may impact security, related to each
entity identified in step 2.
This is a brainstorming step. For each relevant entity identified in the previ-
ous step, use brainstorming techniques to identify contextual attributes that
may be security-relevant. Consider what aspects of each entity’s situation
impact the likelihood of threats to the security objectives identified in step 1
25
being realized. The threats to the security objectives correspond to the sub-
categories of the affected security objective dimension. For example, consider
what aspects of the situation of a user can impact the likelihood of someone
impersonating them, or how the state of a computing device can impact the
likelihood of an unauthorized entity gaining access to it. The objective is to
identify as many attributes as possible. Do not evaluate during this step.
Simply write down all attributes that come to your mind.
This step facilitates a holistic view of a situation by illustrating the importance
of considering context related to every entity that is relevant to the interaction
between a user and a security service. It stresses the fact that characterization
of a situation requires an examination of everything related to the situation,
not only common factors. Refer to Table 3.1 as an abridged illustration of this
step.
• Step 4. Verify that the identified context is relevant by attempting
to classify it by the affected security objective(s) identified in Step
1.
This step is important because although we advocate using a comprehensive
set of context, we only recommend utilizing context that is pertinent to a
particular security service. If context can not be classified by the security
objective(s) identified in step 1 then it is not relevant for that security service.
To illustrate this step, we attempted to classify the context related to the
user’s computing device as found in Table 3.1.
26
Antivirus Status The status of a computing device’s antivirus software af-
fects the likelihood of the device being infected with malicious software. For
example, if no antivirus software is being utilized or it has not been updated
in a long time, then the computing device has an increased likelihood of be-
ing infected with some type of malicious software (malware). The antivirus
status does not, however, indicate what type of malicious software the de-
vice may contain. For example, the device could contain malware that either
allows remote connection by the malware author, steals, alters, or destroys
information. Therefore, this context could fall into the following categories:
confidentiality - unauthorized access to an authorized user’s computing device;
integrity-altering resource once at user’s computing device and availability.
Accordingly, the antivirus software status is clearly relevant.
Orientation of device The orientation of a user’s computing device has
been utilized by context-aware systems to adjust the display of information on
a user’s screen. However, this information does not impact a systems ability
to ensure the confidentiality or integrity of resources, and is thus not security-
relevant.
3.2.2.1 Using the Guidelines to Evaluate Current Systems
In addition to being utilized during the design phase, by slightly altering the
guidelines in section 3.2.2, our taxonomy can be used to evaluate existing security
systems. Identifying the relevant entities and security objectives for the system to be
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evaluated will allow the context currently being used by that system to be assessed.
By classifying the currently used context by our taxonomy, it can be determined
if additional context needs to be considered, and if existing context may not be
pertinent for that system. The following guidelines have been prepared to be used
in conjunction with the taxonomy to assist in the evaluation of existing systems.
1. Refer to step 1 from the guidelines in section 3.2.2.
2. Refer to step 2 from the guidelines in section 3.2.2.
3. Classify the currently used context by the relevant entities identified
in step 1. At a minimum, context related to every relevant entity should
be represented. If this is not the case, then additional context needs to be
considered. See step 3 from the guidelines in section 3.2.2.
4. Refer to step 4 from the guidelines in section 3.2.2.
3.2.3 Repository of Security-Relevant Context
We have created a repository of security-relevant context classified by our
taxonomy (see Appendix A). With the participation of System Administrators
and an Information Assurance Engineer, we have identified a set of discrete values
for each identified contextual attribute. For example, for the contextual attribute,
Antivirus Status, we identified the following values: Not present, Present but not
up-to-date, Present and up-to-date, Present and up-to-date with on-access scanning
enabled. By definition, for something to be relevant it has to have a demonstrable
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bearing on the matter at hand [56]. Accordingly, we also include an explanation for
each relevant attribute’s inclusion in the list. We envision this information serving
as a resource that will allow designers that have identified the relevant entities and
security objective(s) for their system to quickly and easily identify relevant context.
3.3 Incorporating Context into a Security Service
In the previous section we presented a technique to identify security-relevant
context. In this section we present an approach aligned with the shrink-wrapped
security paradigm, to practically incorporate the use of such context into the security
policies that govern a security service, tailored to our focus domain. In line with
the concept of shrink-wrapped security, we advocate the incorporation of as much
relevant context as possible into security policies, to assist more informed decision
making. To facilitate this, we present an approach to abstract relevant contextual
attributes to a security level associated with the security objectives of a system.
Such an approach is useful because it removes the need to explicitly incorporate
each individual attribute into security policies while still obtaining the value of each
attribute, which eases policy development and management.
Before presenting the details of our approach, we present additional details
of the motivating scenario presented in chapter 1, which will help illustrate our
approach. Alice’s company has a set of resources that have different protection
requirements based on their importance. Let us assume that each resource belongs
to one of the following three classes: unclassified, secret and top secret ,which are
29
ordered by ”<”. Different types of resources have different access operations, which
define allowable ways that they can be accessed. For example, the access operations
for a text file may be read only, append, or read and write. In order for a user to
perform a certain access operation on a resource belonging to a certain resource
class, they must have the required permission. A permission is a tuple <access
operation, resource class> that specifies an authorized interaction.
3.3.0.1 Likelihood
By our definition, the values of security-relevant contextual attributes affect
the likelihood of threats to a system’s security objectives being realized. As such,
our approach involves associating a number in the interval [0, 1] with each value
of an attribute, representing that likelihood. For example, the values in table 3.2
represent that if the attribute, currency of device patches, currently has a value of
patches not up-to-date, then the likelihood of a threat to the security system being
realized is .9. However, if the current value of the attribute is patches up-to-date,
then the likelihood of a threat to the security system being realized is only .1. The
likelihood values can be determined in various ways.
There are several approaches to computing the likelihood that an event will
occur, including: classical, frequency, and subjective. Classical probability is based
on having precise models. For example, to calculate the probability that a certain
side of a six-sided die results from tossing the die, a model of the die in which each
side is equally sized and weighted is considered. Frequency probability involves em-
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Contextual Attribute: currency of device patches
Value Likelihood
patches not up-to-date .9
patches up-to-date .1
Table 3.2: Example of likelihood values associated with each value of an attribute
pirically determining the probability. For example, a die would be tossed several
times by several people and ideally their aggregate distribution will approach the
correct distribution. Subjective probability involves asking experts for their opinion
on the likelihood of an event. The selection of an approach should be based on the
situation and available information. In security it is often not possible to directly
evaluate an event’s likelihood using classical techniques [42]. Frequency probability
depends on a system already being built and being in use for some time. It also
assumes environmental stability and replication. We were not focused on any spe-
cific system, but systems in general, so this technique was not appropriate either.
Accordingly, we decided to use a subjective probability approach.
We communicated with a group of eleven security experts to determine how
the values of contextual attributes affect the likelihood of various security threats
being realized. The group consisted of individuals with at least three years of per-
sonal experience, and 105 years of cumulative experience doing security-related work
from various sectors, including industry, government, academia, and military. We
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contend these individuals were able to make informed estimates based on their ex-
perience. Figure 3.2 illustrates an example question that was posed to the group.
The information obtained from this exchange allowed us to associate a threat like-
lihood with each value of an attribute. We used the value selected by a majority
of participants. We also collected information on the perceived level of relevance of
each attribute, as some attributes may be more pertinent to decision making than
others. The relevance values are also numbers in the interval [0, 1].
Figure 3.2: Example likelihood question
The exchange taught us that the values provided by the security professionals
were based on implicit assumptions that are specific to their particular organizations.
As such, it may be most useful if organizations derive the likelihood values associated
with each value of an attribute internally using the approach, or combination of
approaches, most appropriate to the available information. Nevertheless, we contend
that this information can serve as a starting point, and we utilized the values in
the development of our prototype system. In the next subsection we present our
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approach, based on logic programming, to practically incorporate such information
into the security policies that govern access to resources [30].
3.3.1 Using Generalized Annotated Programs for Shrink-Wrapped
Security
We wanted to develop a principled approach to abstract a user’s context to a
security level, so we decided on a logic-based framework. Specifically, we selected
generalized annotated programs (GAPs), which are logic programs that allow real-
numbered values called annotations to be associated with atomic propositions. Be-
low, we describe GAPs [32] and provide details of how we have tailored this technique
to our focus domain.
Definition 1 (annotated atom/GAP-rule/GAP) GAPs are defined as follows.
• Given A ∈ Prop and annotation x (which is a number in [0, 1], a variable
symbol, or a function over [0, 1]), A : x is an annotated atom.
• Given annotated atoms A0 : x0, A1 : x1, . . . , An : xn, the following: A0 : x0 ←
A1 : x1 ∧ . . . ∧ An : xn
is a GAP rule. The annotated atom A0 : x0 is the head and the conjunction
A1 : x1 ∧ . . . ∧ An : xn is the body.
• A generalized annotated program (GAP)Π is a finite set of GAP rules.
We represent every contextual attribute, relevant entity, and security objective
as an atomic proposition in the set Prop. We also have additional atomic proposi-
33
tions that represent other aggregate security levels.We divide Prop into four subsets
- A, E ,O,G - containing atomic propositions associated with contextual attributes,
relevant entities, security objectives, and aggregates respectively. Specific to our ap-
plication, we introduce two functions. The first is the function threat : A → [0, 1],
which represents the threat likelihood (e.g., .1 for low threat, 0.5 for medium, and
1 for high) associated with the current value of an attribute. The second function,
relev : A → [0, 1], represents the relevancy of each attribute (e.g., .1 for low rele-
vancy, 0.5 for medium relevancy, and 1 for high-relevancy). These values are entered
a-priori.
Specific to our application, we have some restrictions on the composition of
GAP rules. For rules with an atom from set A in the head, the annotation must be a
function of the associated threat and relev functions for that atom. Further, for such
rules, the body must be a tautology (see Rules 3.1-3.6 of Figure 3.3). Intuitively,
we want the threat level assigned to a contextual attribute to be a function of the
threat likelihood and relevancy. If the head of a rule contains a relevant entity atom,
then the body can only have contextual attribute atoms associated with that entity.
Likewise, rules with security objective atoms in the head can only have contextual
attribute atoms associated with that objective in the body 2 . Following, is an
example of how GAPs can be used by an administrator to abstract a user’s situation
to security levels.
2Recall that contextual attributes are classified with our taxonomy by the relevant entity, and
security objective
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Suppose Alice’s company has context providers that can determine the strength
of the user’s password pwd, the authentication technique used by the user auth tech,
who the user is co-located with co-location, the antivirus status of the user’s com-
puting device antivirus, the currency of the user’s system patches patches, and the
connection encryption con-encrypt. Figure 3.3, illustrates a portion of a GAP, Π,
for this scenario.
pwd : relev(pwd) · threat(pwd) ← (3.1)
auth tech : relev(auth tech) · threat(auth tech) ← (3.2)
antivirus : relev(antivirus) · threat(antivirus) ← (3.3)
co-location : relev(co-location) · threat(co-location) ← (3.4)
con-encrypt : relev(con-encrypt) · threat(con-encrypt) ← (3.5)
patches : relev(patches) · threat(patches) ← (3.6)
user :
√
x1 · x2 ← pwd : x1 ∧ auth tech : x2 (3.7)
computing device : x ← antivirus : x (3.8)
confidentiality : avg(x1, x2, x3, x4) ← pwd : x1 ∧ antivirus : x2 ∧ auth tech : x3 ∧ patches : x4 (3.9)
integrity : min
i
xi ← pwd : x1 ∧ antivirus : x2 ∧ auth tech : x3 ∧ patches : x4 (3.10)
availability : x ← antivirus : x (3.11)
overall : max(x1, x2, x3, x4) ← user : x1 ∧ computing device : x2 ∧
communication mechanism : x3 ∧ surrounding environment : x4(3.12)
Figure 3.3: Example GAP (Π)
Rules 3.1-3.6 are standard. Each contextual attribute is assigned an initial
annotation based on the relevancy of the attribute and the threat likelihood. The
value returned by the threat function is simply weighted by the value returned by
the relev function.
35
Note, that while the administrator adheres to our previously mentioned re-
strictions, she has much flexibility in creating the remaining rules. For example, in
rule 3.12 she aggregates the annotations of the relevant entities by selecting the en-
tity that poses the greatest threat. However, in 3.9, she aggregates the annotations
of the security objective confidentiality in a different manner - using the average.
We have implemented a graphical user interface (GUI) for security administra-
tors to allow them to easily define a GAP (see figure 3.4). An administrator selects
an atom, and the corresponding attributes are automatically displayed, along with
their default relevancy values (which can be edited). The administrator is then able
to define a function to aggregate the attributes, and add the current rule to the
GAP.
Figure 3.4: GUI for our GAP editor
Definition 2 (TΠ and Multiple Applications of TΠ) Given GAP Π and In-
terpretation I:
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• An interpretation I is simply an assignment of values to all atomic propositions
- formally a mapping from the set Prop to [0, 1].
• The operator TΠ(I) produces an interpretation that assigns atom A an anno-
tation that is the supremum of all annotations assigned to A in the head of a
rule in Π which satisfies I. Formally: TΠ(I)(A0) = sup{x0 | A0 : x0 ← A1 :
x1 ∧ . . . ∧ An : xn is a rule in Π and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, I |= Ai : xi}.
• For application i of TΠ, we write T(i)Π and define it as follows: for i = 0, T
(i)
Π =





Let I be the set of all possible interpretations. The operator TΠ : I → I, when
given an interpretation, produces a new interpretation based on the program Π. This
operator can be applied multiple times until the interpretation converges. In[32]
it is shown that TΠ is monotonic and that upon convergence, it has a least fixed
point,lfp(TΠ), that captures the maximum annotations of all the atomic propositions
entailed by Π. Hence, the annotation assigned by lfp(TΠ) corresponds to the highest
threat level associated with each atom. This information can be incorporated into
security policy to make decisions about access control.
Recall that shrink-wrapped access control aims to dynamically adjust a user’s
permissions so that at any given time she only has permissions that are appropriate
based on her current situation. In order to explain what we mean by “appropriate”,
let us consider the fact that security in any system should be commensurate with
its risks. Risk is a function of the likelihood of threats to the system being realized
and the resulting impact [42]. We presented an approach to estimate the likelihood
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of threats to the system being realized. The class of a resource will determine the
impact of such an exploit (which is organization dependent). Based on these two
factors, the most appropriate (commensurate) security measure(s) can be employed.
For example, consider the GAP Π presented in figure 3.3. Suppose that
relev(patches) = 1 and for any atom A 6= patches, relev(A) = 0.5. Additionally,
based on the user’s current situation, suppose the threat function returns the fol-
lowing values: threat(pwd) = 0.5, threat(auth tech) = 0.1, threat(antivirus) = 0.5,
threat(patches) = 1, threat(co-location) = 1, and threat(con-encrypt) = 0.1. Presume
after computing the least fixed point ,lfp(TΠ), we obtain an annotation of 0.5 for
confidentiality, and an annotation of 0.27 for integrity. These annotations indicate the
maximum threat likelihood associated with each atom, based on the combination
of the user’s context and the rules generated by the security administrator. Policy
construction is as simple as setting a maximum tolerable threat level for various en-
tities, security objectives, or other aggregates of interest, for each <access operation,
resource category> tuple (permission). For example, if a user wants read access to
a resource in the unclassified class, say a company newsletter, the company may be
willing to accept a high likelihood that the resource will be disclosed because the
information isn’t sensitive or private. In other words, they are willing to accept a
high threat likelihood for the security objective atom, confidentiality, and add the
following rule to their policy ”<read, unclassified>, confidentiality <= .9.” Based
on the annotation of .5 for confidentiality, this user would be granted access because
it is less than the tolerance level of .9.
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Figure 3.5 illustrates our interface to facilitate policy construction. A security
administrator selects a resource class and access operation, then sets threat tolerance
levels for various atoms. The ”Check Constraints” button allows an administrator
to ensure the rule she is about to add is consistent with the existing policy rules.
For example, a policy should not contain a rule that allows a user to perform an
access operation on a resource of high importance if they are not allowed to perform
that same operation on a resource of low importance.
Figure 3.5: Policy builder GUI
3.3.1.1 GAPs Discussion
There are several advantages to using logic programming, specifically GAPs,
to incorporate security-relevant context into shrink-wrapped security policies. First,
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logic programming in general provides a principled approach. An annotated logic
is well aligned with our approach, as each contextual attribute is associated with
a threat likelihood value. GAPs extend annotated logic programming by allow-
ing variables and evaluable functions to be used as annotations. This provides an
administrator with more flexibility in deciding how various contextual attributes
should be combined.
Another benefit of using GAPs is that we can give a user feedback about why
a certain access was denied. This is due to the constructive nature of the least
fixed point operator, lfp(TΠ). In our current implementation we can simply do a
backwards trace to identify each rule that causes the annotation of the atom in the
rule head to exceed the tolerable threat value specified by an administrator. The
union of security attributes in the bodies of all such rules is then the set of atoms
that led to the security decision in question. Therefore, a user can be informed of
the aspect(s) of her context that caused the denial.
Finally, it is important to note that the least fixed point computation takes
polynomial time and obtains the same solution regardless of the arrangement of the
rules in the GAP specified by the administrator. This allows us to quickly make
consistent decisions about access in a principled manner that is a direct, logical
consequence of an administrator’s policies and user’s context.
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3.4 A Framework for Context Acquisition and Use
We developed a framework to facilitate the development and use of shrink-
wrapped security services for the mobile workforce [29]. Our framework was de-
signed with the following requirements in mind.
1. The framework should allow developers to focus on the purpose of a shrink-
wrapped security service without having to deal with the intricacies of sensing
and processing low-level context data.
2. The resource constraints of mobile devices, such as limited memory and com-
puting power, must be addressed.
3. As shrink-wrapped security involves the transmission, processing, and possibly
storage of users’ contextual information, it is critical to ensure the privacy of
this data and make sure that it isn’t disclosed to any unauthorized party.
4. To prevent attempts to circumvent security by forging context, the forging of
context must be prevented.
Figure 3.6 illustrates our layered architecture, which we designed to meet the
previously stated requirements.
Context Providers
It is unlikely that a mobile computing device will have the capability to sense all of
the security-relevant context of interest. Therefore, our framework allows context to
be provided from a variety of distributed sources, including: sensors embedded in a
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Figure 3.6: Shrink-wrapped Security Framework
computing device, external sensors in the environment, context providing services,
and system state 3.
Context Management Layer
The Context Management layer handles retrieving raw data from context providers,
processing and storing it, and providing context to the Application Layer. This layer
contains a component that securely retrieves data from the various context providers.
Validation that the context has not been altered and originated from a valid source
also occurs at this layer. After the data has been validated, it can undergo additional
processing, so that it can be delivered in the most useful format to shrink-wrapped
security services. Various types of processing, such as abstraction/aggregation, are
done at this layer. Due to the processor and memory constraints of mobile devices,
3We assume that the selected context providers are trusted to provide accurate context. There
is an abundance of research on establishing the accuracy of context, but that is outside of the
scope of this research.
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this layer is hosted on a centralized server. Context is securely stored at the server
in either a raw or processed form, depending on the intended use of the information.
An easy interface is provided for shrink-wrapped security services to retrieve
relevant context.
Application Layer
The shrink-wrapped security layer is where security services, such as shrink-wrapped
access control are implemented.
3.4.1 Framework Discussion
Our framework meets the requirements we identified. The layered architec-
ture, in which context sensing and processing is separated from its use, addresses
requirement 1. In addition, the separation is beneficial, because it increases extensi-
bility and reusability [9]. The fact that the processing and storage of context data
that occurs in the Context Management layer is done on a server as opposed to the
mobile device, and that context can be provided from numerous sources, addresses
requirement 2. The secure context retrieval and storage done by the Context Man-
agement layer addresses requirement 3. The context validation component addresses
requirement 4.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter we presented the components necessary to realize shrink-
wrapped security. By defining what constitutes relevant context for security ser-
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vices, and by developing a taxonomy and corresponding guidelines to facilitate its
identification, we have addressed what has been identified as a key challenge in
context-aware system development. We presented a technique to practically incor-
porate the use of context into security policies, allowing administrators to obtain
the value of each attribute without explicitly including each attribute in a policy.
Finally, we presented the design for a framework to facilitate the secure acquisi-
tion and use of such context. In the next chapter we present details about the
implementation of our framework.
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Chapter 4
The Implementation and Use of Shrink-Wrapped Access Control
In this chapter we present details about the implementation of the framework
presented in section 3.4, and shrink-wrapped access control. We first present the
shrink-wrapped access control model. We then introduce the baseline system that
we extended, Rover, and present the updates to the system architecture that were
necessary to implement our framework and shrink-wrapped access control. Finally,
we discuss details of the the actual implementation, and present two usage cases
that describe real-world examples of how users interact with the system.
4.1 Shrink-Wrapped Access Control
Recall that shrink-wrapped access control involves utilizing context to dynam-
ically adjust a user’s permissions so that at any given time she only has the permis-
sions that are appropriate, based on her current situation. Figure 4.1 illustrates
the basic model for shrink-wrapped access control. A subject requests access to a
resource. This request will identify the particular resource and an access operation
appropriate for that type of resource. All requests for access are mediated by an
access control mechanism. The mechanism consults the current security policy and
requests the values of the contextual attributes that are included in the constraints
for access to the requested resource. The values of the contextual attributes are
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returned. Based on the subject’s situation, determined by the values of the con-
textual attributes, access is granted or denied. Because the situation of a subject
is not likely to stay constant, the contextual attributes of interest are monitored
to make sure that access is still appropriate according to policy. If the constraints
are no longer fulfilled, then access is revoked. The session with the access control
mechanism ends once access has either been denied or revoked. In this way, permis-
sions are a function of the subject’s context and are dynamically adjusted based on
context.
Figure 4.1: Shrink-wrapped Access Control Model
With shrink-wrapped access control, permissions are not the only thing that
can change dynamically. In certain domains, it may even be appropriate for the
actual security policy, or rules that determine access, to change dynamically. The
policy would not necessarily change based on the situation of a mobile user, but
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based on external circumstances. For example, in response to an increase to the
overall threat level on the Internet, a policy with more stringent constraints might
be appropriate.
4.2 Baseline System
We extended an existing context-aware framework, Rover, to to implement
the shrink-wrapped security framework and shrink-wrapped access control. Rover
is an integration framework developed at the Maryland Information and Network
Dynamics Laboratory (MIND Lab). It was designed to ease the movement of infor-
mation between divergent entities. It provides the ability to handle context, manage
entities and resources, and to integrate heterogeneous data sources. This framework
can be molded to be used in a variety of domains, ranging from university and busi-
ness campuses to public safety. For a detailed description of Rover see [8]. Figure
4.2 shows the basic components that comprise a Rover system. A Rover system
represents a single domain of administrative control, managed and moderated by a
Rover Server.
Rover Server - A Rover server has the responsibility for mitigating the flow of
information between all entities in a Rover system
• Logging component – Logs all messages that pass through the Rover server in
a database
• Resource Interfaces - Interfaces to local and remote resources
• Context Manager - Manages context for all Rover entities. The context man-
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Figure 4.2: Baseline Rover System
ager contains context enhancers, which can abstract or refine contextual at-
tributes. For example, if a subject’s location is provided as a building number,
a context expander can provide the corresponding latitude and longitude and
vice-versa.
Rover Clients - Rover clients include people interacting in a Rover system through
a desktop, laptop, or handheld device.
Resources - Resources, including various services and data sources, can be either
local or remote to the Rover server
4.3 Updated System
We extended Rover to implement the shrink-wrapped security framework pre-
sented in section 3.4 and shrink-wrapped access control (see figure 4.3). Recall that
our framework has the following layers: Application, Context Management, and
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Context Provider. These layers are hosted on Rover Clients, the Rover Server, or
third party context providers. The application layer is where shrink-wrapped secu-
rity services are implemented, such as shrink-wrapped access control, and is hosted
on Rover Client devices. The components of the Context Management layer are
hosted on the Rover Server. Components of the Context Provider layer can be
hosted on various components of a Rover system, including the server, clients and
third party context providers.
Figure 4.3: Updated Rover System
Some of the components of our framework were already, at least partially, im-
plemented. For example, the context enhancers of the baseline system align with
our Context Aggregation and Abstraction component. Additionally, the existing
logging component of the baseline system was used to implement our Context Stor-
age component.
The following include some of the ways we changed and extended the baseline
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system to implement the shrink-wrapped security framework and shrink-wrapped
access control:
• Created a single, uniform interface for resource access
– In the baseline system, each resource had its own separate interface. We
created a single, uniform interface for all resource access, facilitating im-
plementation of an access control mechanism that mediates all resource
requests from Rover clients.
• Secure Context Retrieval
– In the baseline system, communication between Rover entities occurs via
unsecured TCP or HTTP connections, leaving both context and resources
transferred between them vulnerable to sniffing and modification. Main-
taining the integrity and confidentiality of context are fundamental design
requirements of the shrink-wrapped security framework. As such, we se-
cure the transfer of context between Rover entities.
One of the assumptions of our framework is that there is a pre-existing
trust relationship between the Rover Server and the selected context
providers. This trust is affirmed and verified via digital certificates. The
Rover server acts as a Certificate Authority and creates and signs the
certificates of trusted context providers. We use TLS/SSL sockets to
allow the Rover Server to verify that it is communicating with an autho-
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rized context provider, and secure context transmission from unautho-
rized tampering or disclosure.
• Automatic Context Acquisition
– In the baseline system, Rover client users can provide and update their
own context to the system. To prevent users from attempting to circum-
vent security by forging context, we added an agent to the Rover client
that automatically retrieves context.
• GAPS Reasoning Engine
– In addition to the existing context enhancers, we added a GAPs reasoning
engine to the Context Management Layer hosted on the Rover Server.
Such an addition allows the abstraction of a user’s context to a security
level and facilitates the incorporation of context into security policies.
• Resource Container
– Achieving shrink-wrapped access control requires a controlled environ-
ment for resource access on a client device. Control of the resource must
be maintained to allow the timely adjustment of access as determined
by policy and a user’s dynamic context. As such, we introduce the con-
cept of a resource container, which allows us to control the functionality
of default resource viewers and ensure that resources are not stored in
cleartext on non-volatile storage of a client device. We have embedded
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the Rover Client with a resource container that controls the usage of
resources granted by the Rover Server.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the sequence of events that occur when a Rover client user
requests access to a resource.
Figure 4.4: Rover client user resource request
1. The resource access request goes to the Rover sever, where it is handled by
the access control mechanism contained on the server
2. The access control mechanism obtains a list of contextual attributes used in
the rule that corresponds to the particular access request, and the providers of
those attributes. For example,{Client Agent:Antivirus Status, ’128.8.126.42:28007’:Co-
location of people} indicates that the attribute Antivirus Status is available
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from the client agent, and Co-location of people is available from an external
context providing service at IP address 128.8.126.42, port 28007
3. The access control mechanism requests the values of the contextual attributes
from the appropriate providers
4. When requested context is received, the access control mechanism determines
if all requested values have been returned and the rule is ready to evaluate. If
all requested values have been received, the rule is evaluated to determine if
access shall be granted or denied
5. If access is granted, contextual attributes are monitored for changes to make
sure constraints remain satisfied.
6. If access is denied or revoked, the access control session is terminated
4.4 Implementation Details
4.4.1 Client
Our prototype Rover client was implemented with the C# programming lan-
guage. This allows the client to be run on any machine with the .NET Framework
installed. The Rover client agent was implemented using Windows Management
Instrumentation (WMI). WMI is the Microsoft implementation of Web-based En-
terprise Management (WBEM), an industry initiative to develop a standard tech-
nology for accessing management information in an enterprise environment [1]. We
used WMI to query and monitor components of the security-relevant context of a
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Rover client device. Our resource container was implemented using the Edraw Of-
fice Viewer Component (EOVC), an ActiveX document container for hosting Office
documents and PDFs [2]. This allowed us to tightly control resource usage by re-
moving functionality from the default resource viewers. For example, we removed
the ability copy, save as, and print, to ensure the Rover client maintains control of
a resource. In addition, this component allows the display of password protected
resources without the user having to know the password, or revealing the password
to the user. This allowed us to ensure that resources are not stored in cleartext on
non-volatile storage of a Rover client, which is a key factor of maintaining control
of a resource. Finally, this component facilitated the immediate revocation of a
resource, if contextual constraints were no longer met.
4.4.2 Server
We extended the codebase of the baseline Rover server. The server was imple-
mented using Python, a cross-platform scripting language. This allows the server to
run on a variety of platforms. We added a function for requesting access to resources
to the server application programming interface (API). This function serves as the
single gateway to all resources and is where access control is implemented.
OpenSSL, an open source toolkit that implements the secure sockets layer
(SSL) and transport layer security (TLS) protocols, as well as a full-strength general
purpose cryptography library [3], was used to implement the certificate authority on
the Rover Server. This was used to generate and sign certificates for trusted context
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providers.
The baseline system used SQLite, a self-contained, serverless, zero-configuration,
transactional SQL database engine [4], for authentication, context storage and log-
ging. In addition, we added tables to store access control rules, information about
contextual attributes and providers, and the likelihood and relevancy values associ-
ated with contextual attributes used by our GAPS reasoning engine.
4.5 Usage Cases
The following usage cases further illustrate the implementation of our sys-
tem and the interaction between a Rover Server, Rover Client devices, and context
providers.
4.5.1 Bring Your Own Device
Alice works for an Intelligence Agency. Her company recently decided to let
employees bring their own mobile devices to work for personal and work related
use, because it has been proven to increase productivity. Her company is aware of
the security risks introduced by this and decided to utilize the Rover Framework
to implement shrink-wrapped access control for a file server that employees use to
access corporate resources.
Alice’s Agency operates under two conditions ’normal’, when there is no ap-
parent hostile activity against the Agency or computer networks in general, and ’high
alert’, when there is an increased risk of attack against the Agency or computer net-
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works in general. Admission to the Agency campus is controlled, and everyone must
wear a badge with embedded sensors that allow identifying and tracking the location
of that individual. There are employees and visitors on the campus. Employees can
have different clearance levels and some employees don’t have a clearance.
Alice’s Agency currently has context providers that can determine the authen-
tication technique used by the user, who the user is co-located with, the antivirus
status of the user’s computing device, the status of the user’s firewall, and the
connection encryption status. The security administrators performed the following
prerequisite tasks necessary to implement shrink-wrapped access control:
• They associated a likelihood with each discrete value of every contextual at-
tribute they utilize, and a relevancy value for each attribute. They decided
to use the default attribute values, likelihoods, and relevancy values from our
survey of security professionals.
• They used the administrator’s interface to define a GAP that specifies how
attributes will be aggregated by various entities, security objectives, and the
overall situation.
• They used the administrator’s interface to define the access control rules. For
every operating condition, resource class, and access operation combination,
they set a tolerable threat level for either security objectives, entities, or the
overall situation (see figure 4.5).
• They used the certificate authority on the Rover Server to issue digital certifi-
cates to each context provider for authentication and secure communication.
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Figure 4.5: Administrator’s Interface - defining access control rules
Alice has a Secret clearance. She is about to go to lunch and is waiting for a
friend in a company lounge area. While waiting, she decides to use her mobile tablet
to read an Agency proposal document, which is an unclassified, but proprietary
document. She requests access to the file via the Rover Client application on her
tablet (see figure 4.6).
Alice’s request is sent to the Rover Server where the access control mecha-
nism handles the request. Based on the access operation (read), the resource class
(unclassified), and the current operating condition (normal), the server queries the
database for the corresponding access control rule, the contextual attributes neces-
sary to evaluate the rule, and the providers of those attributes. The rule associated
with this particular request is ”integrity <= .4, confidentiality <=.5.” That means
that the likelihood of a threat to integrity has to be less than or equal to .4 and
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Figure 4.6: Requesting access to a resource
the likelihood of a threat to confidentiality has to be less than or equal to .5 for
access to the resource to be granted. The contextual attributes necessary to esti-
mate the threat to integrity and confidentiality based on the user’s current situation
are the authentication technique used by the user, the antivirus status of the user’s
computing device, the status of the user’s firewall, the connection encryption sta-
tus, and the co-location of people. The providers of the attributes are {Client
Agent:Antivirus Status, firewall status, 128.8.126.42:65001:Co-location of people,
RoverServer:Authentication Technique, Connection Encryption Status}.
The Rover Server uses multiple threads to securely connect to the context
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providers via TLS/SSL sockets and requests the needed values. The TLS/SSL pro-
tocol verifies that the context providers’ posses a Rover Server signed certificate,
and that the identity presented in the certificate matches the provider. If this is
not the case, the connection fails. The protocol then cryptographically secures
the connection to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted con-
text. As the providers return the values of the requested contextual attributes,
the Rover Server checks to see if there is any outstanding context left to evalu-
ate the rule. If the rule is ready to evaluate, the server retrieves the likelihood
values that correspond with the current value of the contextual attributes from the
database and that information is provided to the GAPS reasoning engine. In Alice’s
case, the agent included on her Rover client returned the following - ’Antivirus Sta-
tus: Present and up-to-date with on-access scanning enabled, Firewall Status: Not
present’. The Rover Server itself maintains some context on all connected clients
and returned the following values - ’Authentication Technique:Password-based, Con-
nection Encryption:Encrypted’. The external location server provided the following
value ’Co-location of people: Not co-located with unauthorized users’. The corre-
sponding likelihoods associated with these values are as follows: Antivirus Status:
Present and up-to-date with on-access scanning enabled = .1, Firewall Status: Not
present = 1, Authentication Technique:Password-based = .5, Connection Encryp-
tion:Encrypted = .1. The relevancy value associated with each of the mentioned
attributes is 1.
The following table illustrates the annotation assigned to all atoms based on
the GAP illustrated in figure 3.3. Each column represents iteration i of the fixpoint
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Π , the operator has reached a fixed point, and the final annotations
correspond to the maximum threat level for each atom.
Figure 4.7: Interpretations produced by multiple applications of TΠ
The final value of integrity is .1875 and the final value of confidentiality is .425.
The rule to access the resource, which is ”integrity <= .4, confidentiality <=.5.” is
satisfied, and Alice’s request is granted.
The resource is transmitted from the Rover Server to the Rover Client on
Alices device where it is displayed by the resource container. As illustrated in
Figure 4.8, the resource container has disabled functionality of the default DOC file
viewer to maintain control of the resource and grant the appropriate access. For
example, since Alice was only granted read access to the document, the ability to
save any changes to the document has been disabled. Also to maintain control of
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the document, the ability to save the document under another name or location has
been disabled.
Figure 4.8: Resource displayed in the Resource Container
While perusing the proposal document, a notification pops up on Alice’s de-
vice that she has received an email. The email claims to contain a link to the latest
version of the Angry Birds application. Alice clicks on the link to download the
application and her on-access scanner blocks the download and presents a warning
message indicating that the file is malicious. Alice assumes that the on-access scan-
ning functionality of her device is being overly aggressive and decides to disable it
so that she can try the latest Angry Birds application (see Figure 4.9). The Con-
text Agent on Alice’s device detects that a change to a security-relevant contextual
attribute has occurred and sends the updated value, ’Antivirus Status: Present and
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up-to-date’, to the Rover Server where the current access rights are re-evaluated.
Figure 4.9: Disabling on-access scanning capability
The following table illustrates the annotation assigned to all atoms based on
the updated context and the GAP in figure 3.3 .
The updated, final value of integrity is .283 and the updated, final value of
confidentiality is .525. The rule to access the resource, which is ”integrity <= .4,
confidentiality <=.5.” is no longer satisfied and therefore the Rover Server sends
a message to the Rover Client on Alice’s device to revoke her current access. The
resource container on Alice’s device informs her via popup message that her access
has been revoked and closes the resource, thus ending the current session (see Figure
4.11).
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Figure 4.10: Interpretations produced by multiple applications of TΠ
Figure 4.11: Access Revoked after rule no longer satisfied
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4.5.2 Targeted Attacks
Bob works for the same company as Alice, and like her, meets colleagues in
the company lounge. While waiting in the lounge, Bob decides to read the same
Agency proposal document presented in Scenario 1 on his mobile, biometric-enabled,
phone. Recall that the rule associated with this particular request is ”integrity <=
.4, confidentiality <=.5.”. The context providers return the following values for Bob,
’Antivirus Status: Present and up-to-date with on-access scanning enabled, Firewall
Status: Present and up-to-date, Authentication Technique: Biometric-based, Con-
nection Encryption:Encrypted, Co-location of people: Not co-located with unau-
thorized users’. The values assigned to integrity and confidentiality based on Bob’s
context and the GAP defined in figure 3.3 are integrity = .136 and confidentiality
= .200. These values satisfy the rule and access to the resource is granted. A short
time later, the Agency security administrator received notification that the Agency
was being targeted for cyber attacks. Accordingly, she logs into the Rover Ad-
ministrator’s Interface and updates the operating condition from ’Normal’ to ’High
Alert’ (see figure 4.12. This update causes the Rover Server to re-evaluate access
for all Rover Clients that are currently accessing resources. This involves fetching
the new access rule based on the updated operating condition and seeing if the new
restriction is met. The new rule based on the access operation (read), the resource
class (unclassified), and the current operating condition (high alert) is ”integrity
<= .1, confidentiality <=.1. Bob no longer meets the requirements and a message
is sent to the Rover Client on Bob’s device to revoke his current access. The resource
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controller on Bob’s device informs him via popup message that his access has been
revoked and closes the resource, thus ending the current session.
Figure 4.12: Updating Operating Condition to ’High Alert’
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we presented our implementation of the logical shrink-wrapped
security framework presented in section 3.4, and shrink-wrapped access control.
We described the extensions and modifications we made to our baseline system,
Rover, to complete the implementation. We also detailed real-world usage cases
that highlight the interaction between a user and the system, and demonstrate the
feasibility of shrink-wrapped security. In the next chapter we present our evaluation
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of shrink-wrapped access control.
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Chapter 5
The Evaluation of Shrink-Wrapped Access Control
In this chapter we present an evaluation of our implementation of shrink-
wrapped access control. We first present our performance evaluation. We describe
our performance objective, and experiment setup. Initial experiment results and an
analysis of those results are then presented. We discuss the evaluation of our revised
implementation, which resulted from analyzing the results of our initial experiment.
Finally, we present a discussion of the security enhancements provided by shrink-
wrapped access control.
5.1 Performance Assessment
We conducted a performance assessment to evaluate the performance of shrink-
wrapped security. The specific aspect of performance we evaluated was the response
time, which is the amount of (wall) time between when a resource request is made
and the response is received. This is critical because although we want to prevent
inappropriate access to resources, we also want to ensure timely access to resources
when appropriate. The objective was to ensure the response time was acceptable.
Table 5.1, below, shows the maximum acceptable response times for various cate-
gories of user interface (UI) events [15, 12, 36, 40].
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Table 5.1: Acceptable response times
User Interface Event Category Maximum Acceptable Re-
sponse Time
Instantaneous response - Events for which users should
feel that they are directly and instantaneously manip-
ulating objects in the UI. For example, the time from
when a user selects a column in a table until that col-
umn is highlighted, or otherwise provides feedback that
it is selected.
.1 second
Immediate response - Events that users typically per-
ceive as easily performed and thus would expect an im-
mediate system response. For example, the time to re-
size a selected column in a table by double clicking it.
1 second
Unit task response - Events that users typically expect
to take time. For example displaying a graph of the data
in a table, or processing all user input to any task.
10 seconds
5.1.1 Experiment Setup
There are three main categories of techniques used to conduct performance
assessments: simple timers, profilers, and instrumentation methods [58]. We chose
manual instrumentation because it provided the most control and granularity of
what to measure. We added code to the Rover Client and Rover Server to capture
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the time to complete the following tasks involved in the execution of shrink-wrapped
security (see figure 4.4):
• Securely retrieve context from the Rover Client Agent
• Securely retrieve context from an external Context Providing Service
• Securely retrieve local context from the Rover Server
• Run the GAPS Reasoning Engine
• The overall response time
We used three devices for the experiment, one to host the Rover Client, one
to host the Rover Server, and one to host a Context Providing Service. Table
5.2 describes these devices. The Rover Client was hosted on a device running the
Windows operating system, with 1 GB RAM, a 3.20 GHz processor, and a 233
GB hard drive. The Rover Server was hosted on a device running the openSuse
operating system, with 3.2 GB RAM, a 3.00 GHz dual-core processor, and a 208
GB hard drive. The Context Providing Service was hosted on a device running the
openSuse operating system, with 1 GB RAM, a 3.2 GHz processor, and an 89 GB
hard drive. All three devices were connected via Ethernet.
For each of the following configurations, we sent 100 resource requests en block
and measured the amount of time taken to complete the previously listed tasks:
• Shrink-Wrapped Rover System utilizing 5 contextual attributes
• Shrink-Wrapped Rover System utilizing 10 contextual attributes
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Table 5.2: Summary of Devices
Rover Client Rover Server Context Providing Server
Operating System Windows openSUSE openSUSE
Processor 3.2 GHz 3.00 GHz (dual-core) 3.2 GHz
RAM 1 GB 3.2 GB 1 GB
Hard Drive 233 GB 208 GB 89 GB
• Shrink-Wrapped Rover System utilizing 15 contextual attributes
The Rover Client, Rover Server and Context Providing Service were restarted
after each 100 requests to prevent previous runs from influencing subsequent runs.
For each of the configurations, the same access control rule and GAP was used, and
context from the Rover Server, Rover Client, and Context providing service was
utilized.
5.1.2 Experiment Results
Figure 5.1 illustrates the results of our assessment. The overlapping column
chart shows the average time in milliseconds (ms) to complete the previously men-
tioned tasks for each configuration. As we measured the wall time, which includes
all system overhead, such as system calls and context switching, we also measured
the system load on the devices hosting the Rover Client, Rover Server, and Context
Providing Service during each experiment (see Figure 5.2). We used the processor
queue length, the number of threads in the processor queue, to approximate the
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system load.
Figure 5.1: Average response time in milliseconds
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Figure 5.2: System load of devices during experiment
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5.1.3 Analysis of Results
The average total response times of the shrink-wrapped system utilizing 5, 10
or 15 contextual attributes were comparable, ranging from 233.3 ms to 240.7 ms. The
proximity of response times for the different shrink-wrapped system configurations
illustrates that adding additional contextual attributes to the system has minimal
effect on the response time. As illustrated in Figure 5.2 the load on the devices was
comparable for each configuration, so we do not believe varying loads significantly
affected the experiments. The load on the machine hosting the Rover Client slightly
increases as the number of attributes increase, likely because of the context agent
hosted on the client performing additional WMI queries. The response times of the
shrink-wrapped security configurations are well under the acceptable response times
of 1 second for easily completed tasks, and 10 seconds for completing tasks a typical
user would expect to take time.
Although the response times observed in our experiment were acceptable, they
could be improved. The amount of time to securely retrieve context from the Rover
Client was significantly longer than the time to retrieve local context from the
Rover Server, and context from the Context Server. This was due to the Rover
Client Agent performing WMI queries each time a context request was received.
We implemented caching of security-relevant context on the Rover Client Agent to
improve response time. We updated The Rover Client Agent to query WMI for
the state of relevant contextual attributes when the Rover Client initially starts
and cache those values. The Rover Client Agent also subscribes to notifications of
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changes to those attributes, so the cache is automatically updated when a change in
relevant context occurs, maintaining the freshness of the values. Figure 5.3, below,
shows the results of our experiment with caching on the Rover Client Agent. As
illustrated, caching reduces the time to retrieve context from the Rover Client Agent
by almost 100 milliseconds, reducing the total response time by approximately the
same amount. It also results in a lighter load on the Rover Client device (see figure
5.4).
Figure 5.3: Response times with Rover Client Agent caching
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Figure 5.4: System load on Rover Client with context caching
Further improvement in response time could be achieved if the Rover Server
pre-established a secure connection with the remote Context Server, because a ma-
jority of the time to retrieve context, approximately 6 milliseconds, was spent es-
tablishing the secure connection. Clearly, connection establishment time is not
expended retrieving local context, and a connection is already established between
the Rover Server and Rover Client when context is retrieved. As a majority of
the time communicating with external context providers is spent establishing secure
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communication, when adding additional attributes it would be ideal if the context
providers can be consolidated as much as possible to minimize that overhead.
5.2 Security Enhancements
There are no well-accepted metrics for measuring the effectiveness or func-
tional quality of an access control service [25, 26]. Nonetheless, we discuss the
security enhancements of shrink-wrapped access control with respect to well estab-
lished security principles that deal with fundamentals concepts, not just a particular
implementation.
The Principle of Least Privilege states that users should operate with the least
set of privileges necessary to complete a job [45]. The intent of the principle is to
limit the accidental and intentional improper use of privileges. This principle, like
traditional security mechanisms, originated when users were typically computing in
static environments. Shrink-wrapped access control presents another dimension on
which to limit a user’s privileges that is more aligned with users computing in dy-
namic situations - their context. This additional dimension allows not only a user’s
task, but a user’s current situation to be taken into consideration to appropriately
restrict privileges, further limiting the improper use of privileges.
There are two primary approaches to security in dynamic computing environ-
ments. One approach is to require systems to implement the most stringent security
controls, based on the highest threat level a user may be exposed to in all possible
scenarios. This approach is very rigid and has the following disadvantages:
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• Security controls often reduce the functionality and usability of a system, and
unnecessary and excessive deployment of security controls often reduces user
acceptance of a system [23].
• This approach does not easily adjust to the fact that the assumed strength
(and association with stringency) of security controls constantly change, for
example because of newly discovered vulnerabilities, the development of more
efficient algorithms, and advances in computer processing speed.
The other approach, involves adopting security to the changing situation. This is the
approach shrink-wrapped access control takes and it facilitates another fundamental
security principle that states that security in any system should be commensurate
with its risks 1 [42]. With shrink-wrapped access control, security-relevant contex-
tual attributes, which by definition allow estimating the likelihood of threats to a
system being exploited, are utilized. Resources are categorized based on the impact
of an exploitation, and there are different policies based on the current operating
condition. If the strength of a security control changes, the likelihood associated
with the value of the corresponding contextual attribute is simply updated to reflect
the change. Based on these factors, shrink-wrapped access control allows adjusting
security measures, which in the case of access control equates to allowing, denying,
or revoking permissions, so that they are commensurate with risk.
Finally, shrink-wrapped access control allows the automatic enforcement of
policies that were previously left up to the user to enforce. Removing the burden of
1Recall that risk is a function of the likelihood of threats to the system being realized and the
resulting impact.
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security enforcement from the user and putting it in the security service is a major
benefit, as users are notoriously the weakest link in security.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter we presented our evaluation of shrink-wrapped access con-
trol. We presented a discussion of the security enhancements of shrink-wrapped
access control. We also illustrated that it can provide access decisions well below
established acceptable response times, further illustrating the feasibility of shrink-
wrapped security. In the next chapter we present an overview of research in areas




In this chapter we present an overview of related work in the research areas that
are primary to shrink-wrapped security. We include the following areas: utilizing
more comprehensive context, focusing on security-relevant context, context-aware
access control, and using logic programming in context-aware access control.
6.1 More Comprehensive Context
Since the early days of context-aware computing, researchers have realized that
a more comprehensive notion of context is necessary. In one of the first papers to use
the term “context-aware computing”, Schilit et al. state that contextual attributes
other than location are of interest including: lighting, noise level, network connec-
tivity, communication costs, communication bandwidth, and the social situation.
In this research, the authors were focused on applications to enhance the quality
of life of the intended users, such as proximate selection and automatic contextual
reconfiguration [47]. Schmidt et al. also advocate a wider notion of context and
argue that more than location is needed to approximate a situation, especially for
“ultra mobile computing” where users operate their computing devices while on the
move. This work stresses the importance of additionally considering the physical
conditions in a given environment. Enhancing the quality of life of users through
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applications that perform adaptive user interfaces, context-aware communication,
and proactive application scheduling was the focus of this work [51]. Additional
researchers have advocated a broader concept of context as well [6, 52], but we are
unaware of any that have specifically focused on context that is relevant to security.
6.2 Security-relevant Context
The importance of context that is relevant to security was realized as early as
2000 when Generalized Role-Based Access Control (GRBAC), one of the first incor-
porations of context-awareness into security, was proposed. GRBAC is an extension
of role-based access control that includes a new type of role, an “environment role”,
to capture security-relevant context of the environment in which an access request
was made [21]. Subsequently, other researchers have highlighted security-relevant
context in their work [53, 18, 41, 24, 44]. For example, the Context-Aware Role-
Based Access Control model (CGRBAC) provides access control for web services
and also extends RBAC to include a role for capturing security-relevant context.
The CGRBAC model addresses the unique access control requirements of global
web services that are composed of atomic web services [24].
Approaches like those discussed in [53, 18, 13] particularly highlight the sig-
nificance of context in security services as they are context-centric and completely
replace attributes that are traditionally used in security-related decisions with con-
text. This type of approach is useful when the identities of users are not known
in advance or are not trustworthy. The Contextual Attribute-based Access Con-
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trol (CABAC) model uses context to specify and enforce authorization policies for
mobile users [18]. Toninelli et al. propose an approach similar to Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC) that uses context to group users and assign permissions [53].
Bhatti et al. use context to determine the trust level of users that are not known
a priori [13]. Undoubtedly, researchers have recognized the significance of security-
relevant context, but the fact that the term had yet to be specifically defined left
it ambiguous and made the systematic identification and use of such context nearly
impossible.
Mostfaoui defined a security context:
A security context is a set of information collected from the users environment
and the application environment and that is relevant to the security infrastructure
of both the user and the application [39].
This definition was too vague for our objectives because it is not of much assistance
when trying to determine what is and is not security-relevant context.
6.3 Context-Aware Access Control
There are existing context-aware access control systems. We contend that al-
though they consider context, they are still relatively static due to a combination of
factors, including: limited context use, infrequent context consideration, and lack
of continuity in resource control. For example, in [19] the authors present imple-
mentation work, based on their previously proposed GRBAC model, in which they
focus on securing smart homes. They use context to adopt security to changing
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conditions when requests are made. In [14], the authors extend their previous work
on an XML-based RBAC framework to incorporate the use of context. They use
context to establish a trust level for users that are not known in advance, and subse-
quently use these trust levels to control access to web services. In these approaches,
context is only considered during the initial request to access a resource. This is not
sufficient in highly dynamic computing environments because relevant context may
change during a session and warrant a re-evaluation of access decisions.
There are context-aware access control systems that involve monitoring con-
text during a session and adapting based on changes. For example, in [33] the
authors present an authorization framework in the context of the Gaia operating
system for active (smart) spaces. Gaia brings the functionality of an operating sys-
tem to physical spaces. In their system, publish-subscribe event channels are used to
control the system and disseminate information resources. They use cryptographic
mechanisms to enforce dynamic authorizations by controlling the ability to send
and receive messages via a secure distribution system. Users are provided symmet-
ric keys to access encrypted resources that they have authorization to access. Key
revocation is used to deny access when permissions change, so that future requests
will be denied. In [53] the authors present an approach to securely share resources
in ad-hoc networking scenarios in which users may not be known in advance or their
identity may not be trusted. They use a resource-centric approach to context-aware
access control, basing access decisions on the context of a protected resource. Policy
reevaluation can be triggered by a change to resource context. Although these ap-
proaches are more dynamic than those that only consider context during the initial
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request for a resource, they do not deal with continuity in resource access and the
control necessary to allow access to be revoked when appropriate [46].
6.4 Logic Programming
Previously, logic programming has been employed for context-aware access
control in various ways. For example, in [43] the authors use first order logic to
model context as first order predicates. For instance, Location(Chris, entering, room
3231) represents the situation where a user, Chris, is entering room 3231. They
have integrated this technique into their smart space framework, GAIA, and use
it to perform a set of actions when an associated context expression becomes true.
They have also integrated their modelling approach into a security architecture,
Cerberus, in which they focus on authentication and access control [7]. In Cerberus,
policies are written as rules in first order logic. Loke introduced an extension to
Prolog, which is a general purpose logic programming language, called LogicCAP
(short for Logic programming for Context-Aware Pervasive applications)[35]. The
extension is used to provide native support for context-aware applications in logic
programming. A new operator, “in situation”, is introduced to facilitate reasoning
about an entity being in a predefined situation. In [53] the authors propose a
context-centric approach for access control in ad-hoc scenarios. Their approach is
inspired by RBAC, but uses context instead of roles to provide a level of indirection
between entities and permissions. They use a combination of description logic and
logic programming to specify and evaluate access control policies. However, we
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are unaware of any previous work that utilizes annotated logic in context-aware
security decision making. As a result, contextual attributes must be identified with
a boolean variable instead of a range of values as we do here by leveraging an
annotated logic. An extension to annotated logic programs, GAPs allow variables
and evaluable functions to be used as annotations. As such, our use of GAPs allows
an administrator more flexibility in deciding how various contextual attributes are
combined, which can lead to the creation of policies that are not possible to express
in other frameworks.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we have provided an overview of related research areas. It was
not our goal to provide an exhaustive survey of the state-of-the-art in context-aware
security, but to focus on those areas that are key to shrink-wrapped security. We
discussed research that focused on the necessity of using a more comprehensive set
of context when developing context-aware systems, and approaches that highlight
the importance of context that is specifically useful for context-aware security. We
presented research focusing on context-aware access control, and using logic pro-
gramming to incorporate context into security policies. In the next chapter we
present our conclusions and future work.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter we present an overview of our research and discuss ways that
it can be expanded with future work.
7.1 Research Overview
The mobile workforce, which consists of employees who use mobile comput-
ing devices to connect with the enterprise, and have highly dynamic computing
environments, is rapidly increasing. To enable effective security for such users it
is important to address the disparity between traditional, static approaches to se-
curity and the dynamic computing environment of this emerging user group. In
this dissertation, we have presented our approach to addressing this need with a
novel security paradigm, shrink-wrapped security, that involves utilizing context to
provide a tight coupling between a user’s current situation and security.
We presented the components necessary to realize shrink- wrapped security.
We presented our approach to addressing a key challenge in context-aware system
development by defining what constitutes relevant context for security services, and
developing a taxonomy and corresponding guidelines to facilitate its identification.
We presented a flexible technique that speaks to the fact that security is not binary
in nature, to incorporate the use of security-relevant context into security policies.
85
Our technique is practical as it allows administrators to obtain the value of each
attribute without explicitly including each attribute in a policy. We also presented a
logical framework to facilitate the secure acquisition, monitoring and use of context,
designed with the with the resource constraints of mobile devices in mind.
Finally, we presented the implementation and evaluation of shrink-wrapped
access control. We detailed the extensions of the Rover system that were necessary
to implement our framework and shrink-wrapped access control. We presented real-
world usage cases that highlighted the interaction between a user and the system,
and demonstrated the dynamicity of the system in various situations. Security
enhancements were discussed and we illustrated the ability of our system to provide
access decisions well below established acceptable response times, illustrating the
feasibility of shrink-wrapped security.
In summary the contributions of this dissertation include the following:
• A novel security paradigm, shrink-wrapped security, which involves utilizing
context to tightly fuse a user’s situation and security, to address the security
challenges associated with the highly dynamic computing environment of the
emergent mobile workforce.
• A usable definition of security-relevant context, along with goal oriented guide-
lines and a corresponding taxonomy to facilitate the systematic identification
of contextual attributes that are most pertinent to a security service. These
contributions deal with a key challenge of context-aware system development
- identifying relevant context.
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• A context acquisition and management framework to facilitate the develop-
ment and use of shrink-wrapped security services for the mobile workforce.
The layered architecture of this framework supports secure context acquisi-
tion, utilization, and monitoring by security services and was designed with
the resource constraints of mobile devices in mind.
• An approach based on logic programming to practically incorporate the use
of security-relevant context into the security policies that govern security ser-
vices. This technique is aligned with the shrink-wrapped security concept of
utilizing a comprehensive set of relevant context, while remaining practical
and manageable by abstracting relevant contextual attributes to a security
level associated with the objectives of a security service.
• The implementation and evaluation of shrink-wrapped access control, which
serves as a practical demonstration of the feasibility of shrink-wrapped secu-
rity.
7.2 Future Work
We feel that our work on shrink-wrapped security has laid a strong foundation
towards enabling appropriate security for mobile users with dynamic computing
environments. This field has a large scope and there several ways that our research
can be expanded and different areas that warrant further investigation. We present
some of those areas in this section.
The current implementation of the resource container component of our ar-
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chitecture, which is used to maintain control of a resource on a user device, only
works with Office documents and PDF documents. Making the resource container
extensible by allowing the development of plugins for new data types at various
levels of abstraction should be explored.
We currently obtain the likelihood associated with each value of a security-
relevant contextual attribute from a survey of security experts. Refining these values
by utilizing data from actual exploits is an area for future research. Improvements
in forensics tools and utilizing sensors on devices and networks may facilitate the
collection of useful data that will facilitate this process by providing information
that allows determining which vulnerabilities contributed to an exploitation.
Machine learning techniques that could make a shrink-wrapped security sys-
tem more ’intelligent’ should be investigated. For example, machine learning could
be used to facilitate automatically generating likelihood values for new attributes
or new values of an existing attribute. Such techniques could also be used for de-
termining maximum tolerable threat levels for new operating condition, resource
category, access operation combinations, based on values for existing combinations.
Finally, this dissertation has focused on access control for the mobile workforce.
Investigations into shrink-wrapping other security services, like authentication and
encryption, in different domains, such as smart homes, are areas for future explo-
ration. This would not require an adjustment to our framework, or guidelines for
identifying relevant context, but the domain specific taxonomy would have to be up-
dated to add additional security objectives, if necessary, and domain specific threats
to those objectives would have to be identified. Of course, the implementation would
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be specific to the security service.
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Appendix A
Repository of Security-Relevant Context
Name: Connection Encryption
Relevant Entity: Communication Mechanism
Affected Security Objective(s): Integrity - altering resource while in transit,
Confidentiality- resource sniffing
Explanation: The connection encryption impacts the likelihood of a malicious
party being able to access and/or alter information on the path to the user, result-
ing in a breach of integrity and confidentiality.
Value(s): Not Encrypted, Encrypted
Name: Networks Traversed
Relevant Entity: Communication Mechanism
Affected Security Objective(s): Integrity - altering resource while in transit,
Confidentiality- resource sniffing
Explanation:
Value(s): No untrusted networks traversed, Untrusted networks traversed
Notes: The decision of whether a given network is trusted or not is organization-




Relevant Entity: Computing Device
Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality - unauthorized access to an au-
thorized user’s computing device, Integrity-altering resource once at user’s comput-
ing device, Availability
Explanation: The antivirus software status may implicate the increased probabil-
ity of the computing device being infected with malicious software. The antivirus
status does not, however, indicate what type of malicious software the device may
contain. For example, the device could contain malware that either steals, alters,
or destroys information.
Value(s): Not present, Present but not up-to-date, Present and up-to-date, Present
and up-to-date with on-access scanning enabled
Notes: Up-to-date can refer to software and signature version
Name: Firewall Status
Relevant Entity: Computing Device
Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality - unauthorized access to an au-
thorized user’s computing device, Integrity-altering resource once at user’s comput-
ing device, Availability
Explanation: A firewall can help screen out malicious Internet traffic from reaching
a user’s device. The firewall status may implicate the increased probability of the
computing device being infected with malicious software. The firewall status does
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not, however, indicate what type of malicious software may have reached the user’s
device. For example, the device could contain malware that either steals, alters, or
destroys information.
Value(s): Not present, Present but not up-to-date, Present and up-to-date, Present
and up-to-date with approved configuration
Notes: Approved configuration (e.g., list of ports that should be blocked) is organization-
dependant
Name: Current Processes
Relevant Entity: Computing Device
Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality - unauthorized access to an au-
thorized user’s computing device, Integrity-altering resource once at user’s comput-
ing device, Availability
Explanation: Extraneous processes may indicate that the computing device is in-
fected with malicious software
Value(s): No extraneous processes, Extraneous processes
Notes: The determination of what is extraneous or not is organization-dependent.
Techniques such as developing a profile for each user to determine if various pro-
cesses are normal or not can be employed. The determination should be based on
more than simply process name because some malicious software can masquerade
as a legitimate process.
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Name: Strength of Cryptographic Parameters 1
Relevant Entity: Communication Mechanism
Affected Security Objective(s): Integrity - altering resource while in transit,
Confidentiality- resource sniffing
Explanation: The strength of the cryptographic parameters, which can be deter-
mined by such things as the encryption algorithm and key length, implicate the
likelihood that an unauthorized entity can successfully break the encryption to re-
trieve or alter the encrypted resources resulting in a breach of confidentiality and/or
integrity
Value(s): Weak, Strong
Notes: The determination of weak or strong will vary with time depending on the
emergence of new exploits and increases in computing capability
Name: Password Strength1
Relevant Entity: User
Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality - impersonating an authorized
user to gain access, Integrity - impersonating an authorized user to make unautho-
rized alterations
Explanation: The strength of the password impacts the likelihood of an unautho-
rized user guessing or brute forcing the password to impersonate an authorized and
gaining access to resources
1This contextual attribute is conditional, which means that its relevancy depends on the value
of another attribute. For example, if the value of Connection Encryption = Encrypted, then the
attribute Strength of Cryptographic Parameters is relevant, otherwise it is not.
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Value(s): Weak, Medium, Strong
Notes: Strength determination is organization-dependant. There are several online
password strength assessors
Name: Open Ports
Relevant Entity: Computing Device
Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality - unauthorized access to an au-
thorized user’s computing device, Integrity-altering resource once at user’s comput-
ing device, Availability
Explanation: Open ports are a target for hackers and viruses that use port scan-
ning to identify running services on a host to attempt to compromise it. The exis-
tence of open extraneous open ports may implicate the increased probability of the
computing device being infected with malicious software
Value(s): Extraneous ports open, No extraneous ports open
Notes: The determination of what is extraneous or not is organization-dependant.
It will depend on such things as what services they use
Name: Currency of System Patches
Relevant Entity: Computing Device
Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality - unauthorized access to an au-
thorized user’s computing device, Integrity-altering resource once at user’s comput-
ing device, Availability
Explanation: A patch is a small piece of software that is used to correct a problem
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(often security vulnerability) with a software program or an operating system. If
patches are not up-to-date, the system is vulnerable to the issues addressed in the
patches that have been released. The currency of system patches may implicate the
increased probability of the computing device being infected with malicious soft-
ware. The currency of system patches does not, however, indicate what type of
malicious software the device may contain. For example, the device could contain
malware that either steals, alters, or destroys information.
Value(s): Patches not up-to-date, Patches up-to-date
Notes: Up-to-date doesn’t necessarily refer to having the latest vendor released
patches. For example, some organizations purposefully choose not to install some
patches as they create problems
Name: File Sharing Settings
Relevant Entity: Computing Device
Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality - access to an authorized user’s
computing device, Integrity-altering resource once at user’s computing device
Explanation: A user may have file sharing enabled on their device which allows
them to share files with local or remote users. If such sharing is enabled, the level
of sharing implicates the likelihood that some unauthorized user may access and/or
alter a resource, resulting in a breach of confidentiality and/or integrity
Value(s): File-sharing disabled, Read-only file sharing of resource location, Full-
access file sharing of resource location
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Name: Device Authentication Requirements
Relevant Entity: Computing Device
Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality-unauthorized access to an au-
thorized user’s computing device, Integrity-altering resource once at user’s comput-
ing device
Explanation: If an unauthorized party gains physical access to the device, the
device authentication requirements impact the likelihood that they can gain unau-
thorized access to the content of the device. With this access they can also make
unauthorized alterations to resources
Value(s): No device authentication, Authentication required on initial login, Au-
thentication required on initial login and after x minutes of inactivity
Name: Co-location of People
Relevant Entity: Surrounding Environment
Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality - indirect access through prox-
imity to an authorized user
Explanation: If the user is co-located with people lacking the proper authoriza-
tion to access a resource, then it is possible for those people to obtain unauthorized
access. For example a co-located person can look at the screen of the requesting
user’s computing device.
Value(s): Co-located with unauthorized user(s), Not co-located with authorized
user(s)
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Name: Co-location of Devices
Relevant Entity: Surrounding Environment
Affected Security Objective(s): indirect access through proximity to an autho-
rized user
Explanation: If the user is collocated with certain devices, such as surveillance
cameras or recording devices, then it is possible for an unauthorized party to gain
indirect access to a resource
Value(s): Co-located with surveillance equipment, Not co-located with surveillance
equipment
Name: Internet Threat Level
Relevant Entity: Surrounding Environment
Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality - unauthorized access to an au-
thorized user’s computing device, Integrity-altering resource once at user’s comput-
ing device, Availability
Explanation: The threat level indicates the status of malicious traffic that threat-
ens the global Internet and communications network. The value of the threat level
impacts the likelihood of computing devices in general being infected with malicious
software.
Value(s): Organization-dependant
Notes: Different organizations (e.g. Symantec, SANS Internet Storm Center ) de-
fine various threat levels. The organization’s Security Administrators can also define




Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality - impersonating an authorized
user to gain access, Integrity - impersonating an authorized user to make unautho-
rized alterations
Explanation: The strength of the authentication technique implicates the ease
with which an unauthorized user can impersonate an authorized user and gain ac-
cess to resources and possibly make unauthorized modifications




Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality - impersonating an authorized
user to gain access, Integrity - impersonating an authorized user to make unautho-
rized alterations
Explanation: A large number of failed login attempts prior to successful login,
may indicate that the user is being impersonated by an unauthorized user that will
then be able to access resources and possibly make unauthorized modifications
Value(s): Below x, Above x
Notes: X is determined by administrators
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Name: Duress Status of User
Relevant Entity: User
Affected Security Objective(s): Confidentiality - unauthorized access to an au-
thorized user’s computing device, indirect access through proximity to an authorized
user, Integrity - altering resource once at user’s computing device
Explanation: Whether or not a user is under duress implicates the likelihood of an
unauthorized party gaining access to resources. If a user is under duress, by defini-
tion she is not acting according to her free will, she is being forced to do something.
An unauthorized party can force an authorized user to request access to resources
and subsequently access them (either indirectly through proximity or directly via
the user’s computing device) or force unauthorized modification.




Agent : A program that performs some information gathering or processing task
in the background
Authorized : A system entity or actor that has been granted the right, permission,
or capability to access a system resource
Control : An action, device, procedure, or technique that removes or reduces vul-
nerability
Permission : An authorized interaction that a subject can have with an object
Risk : The combination of the probability of an event and its consequence
Security policy : The set of rules and practices that regulate how an organization
manages, protects, and distributes information.
Security service : A capability that supports one, or more, security requirements,
such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Examples of security services are
encryption, access control, and authentication.
Sniffing : monitoring or eavesdropping on electronic transmissions
Threat : A set of circumstances that has the potential to cause loss or harm. A
potential cause of an unwanted impact to a system or organization
Vulnerability : A flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, im-
plementation, or internal controls that could be exercised and result in a security
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Value Count Percent % 
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Academia 1 9.1% 
Government 1 9.1% 
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Based on the following values of the connection's encryption, please rate the 
likelihood of a malicious party being able to access and/or alter information on 
the path to the user  
 
























Value Count Percent % 
Weak relevance 1 9.1% 
Medium relevance 1 9.1% 
Strong relevance 9 81.8% 
 
Statistics 




Based on the following values of the networks traversed, please rate the 
likelihood of a malicious party being able to access and/or alter information on 
the path to the user 
 
  Low (0-10%) Medium (> 10-50%) High (> 50 â€“ 100%) Total 























Value Count Percent % 
Weak relevance 1 9.1% 
Medium relevance 4 36.4% 
Strong relevance 6 54.5% 
 
Statistics 





Based on the following values of the antivirus status of a user's computing 





















































Value Count Percent % 
Medium relevance 1 9.1% 
Strong relevance 10 90.9% 
 
Statistics 




Based on the following values of the firewall status of a user's computing device, 



















Present but not up-to-date 9.1% 45.5% 45.5% 100% 
1 5 5 11 
























Value Count Percent % 
Weak relevance 1 9.1% 
Medium relevance 3 27.3% 
Strong relevance 7 63.6% 
 
Statistics 






Based on the following values of the current processes running on a computing 
device, please rate the likelihood of the device being infected with malicious 
software 
 
  Low (0-10%) Medium (> 10-50%) High (> 50 â€“ 100%) Total 























Value Count Percent % 
Weak relevance 4 36.4% 
Medium relevance 5 45.5% 
Strong relevance 2 18.2% 
 
Statistics 






Based on the following values of the strength of cryptographic parameters used 
to encrypt the connection, please rate the likelihood that an unauthorized entity 
can successfully break the encryption to retrieve or alter the encrypted resources 
 
























Value Count Percent % 
Weak relevance 1 9.1% 
Medium relevance 1 9.1% 
Strong relevance 9 81.8% 
 
Statistics 





Based on the following values of the open ports of a computing device, please 
rate the likelihood of the computing device being infected with malicious software 
 
  Low (0-10%) Medium (> 10-50%) High (> 50 â€“ 100%) Total 























Value Count Percent % 
Medium relevance 5 45.5% 
Strong relevance 6 54.5% 
 
Statistics 




Based on the following values of the currency of system patches of a computing 
device, please rate the likelihood of the device being infected with malicious 
software 
 
  Low (0-10%) Medium (> 10-50%) High (> 50 â€“ 100%) Total 























Value Count Percent % 
Medium relevance 2 18.2% 
Strong relevance 9 81.8% 
 
Statistics 





Based on the following values of the file sharing settings of a computing device, 













































Value Count Percent % 
Weak relevance 3 27.3% 
Medium relevance 4 36.4% 
Strong relevance 4 36.4% 
 
Statistics 





Based on the following values of the authentication required to login to a 
computing device, please rate the likelihood of a user gaining unauthorized 







High (> 50 
â€“ 100%) 
Total 


















Authentication required on initial login and after x* 















Value Count Percent % 
Weak relevance 1 9.1% 
Medium relevance 3 27.3% 
Strong relevance 7 63.6% 
 
Statistics 





Based on the following values of the co-location of people, please rate the 
likelihood of an unauthorized user gaining access through proximity. 
 
  
Low (0 â€“ 
10%) 





























Value Count Percent % 
Weak relevance 2 18.2% 
Medium relevance 3 27.3% 
Strong relevance 6 54.5% 
 
Statistics 





Based on the following values of the authentication technique used by a user, 
please rate the likelihood of the user being impersonated  
 



















































Value Count Percent % 
Medium relevance 2 18.2% 
Strong relevance 9 81.8% 
 
Statistics 




Based on the following values for the number of login attempts made by a user, 
please rate the likelihood that the user is being impersonated 
 
























Value Count Percent % 
Weak relevance 5 45.5% 
Medium relevance 4 36.4% 
Strong relevance 2 18.2% 
 
Statistics 




Based on the following values of the password strength of the user, please rate 
the likelihood of the user being impersonated 
 

































Value Count Percent % 
Medium relevance 2 18.2% 
Strong relevance 9 81.8% 
 
Statistics 





Based on the following values of the duress status of the user, please rate the 
likelihood of an unauthorized user gaining access to a resource by forcing an 
authorized user to make the requests  
 
  Low (0 â€“ 10%) Medium (>10 â€“ 50%) High (>50%) Total 























Value Count Percent % 
Weak relevance 4 36.4% 
Medium relevance 3 27.3% 
Strong relevance 4 36.4% 
 
Statistics 





Based on the following values of the Internet threat level, please rate the 
likelihood of the user's computing device being infected with malicious software 
 










































Value Count Percent % 
Weak relevance 6 54.5% 
Medium relevance 5 45.5% 
 
Statistics 





Based on the following values of for the devices a user is co-located with, please 








High (> 50 â€“ 
100%) 
Total 
























Value Count Percent % 
Weak relevance 4 36.4% 
Medium relevance 4 36.4% 
Strong relevance 3 27.3% 
 
Statistics 
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